📅 Original date posted:2015-02-05
📝 Original message:The trust can be considered bootstrapped by visual verification of the address prefix. If we are really concerned about someone jamming a Bluetooth signal in a coffeeshop then the UI can encourage verification of the prefix. Much like how regular Bluetooth requires 'pairing' via entering a 4-6 digit code.
Paul Puey CEO / Co-Founder, Airbitz Inc
619.850.8624 | http://airbitz.co | San Diego
On Feb 5, 2015, at 3:46 PM, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
On 02/05/2015 03:36 PM, MⒶrtin HⒶboⓋštiak wrote:
>> A BIP-70 signed payment request in the initial broadcast can resolve the
>> integrity issues, but because of the public nature of the broadcast
>> coupled with strong public identity, the privacy compromise is much
>> worse. Now transactions are cryptographically tainted.
>>
>> This is also the problem with BIP-70 over the web. TLS and other
>> security precautions aside, an interloper on the communication, desktop,
>> datacenter, etc., can capture payment requests and strongly correlate
>> transactions to identities in an automated manner. The payment request
>> must be kept private between the parties, and that's hard to do.
>
> What about using encryption with forward secrecy? Merchant would
> generate signed request containing public ECDH part, buyer would send
> back transaction encrypted with ECDH and his public ECDH part. If
> receiving address/amount is meant to be private, use commit protocol
> (see ZRTP/RedPhone) and short authentication phrase (which is hard to
> spoof thanks to commit protocol - see RedPhone)?
Hi Martin,
The problem is that you need to verify the ownership of the public key.
A MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable identity
associated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need a shared secret (such
as a secret phrase). But the problem is then establishing that secret
over a public channel.
You can bootstrap a private session over the untrusted network using a
trusted public key (PKI/WoT). But the presumption is that you are
already doing this over the web (using TLS). That process is subject to
attack at the CA. WoT is not subject to a CA attack, because it's
decentralized. But it's also not sufficiently deployed for some scenarios.
e
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150205/6bf6a7d3/attachment.html>;
Paul Puey [ARCHIVE] /
npub1rj…80ac2
2023-06-07 15:29:51
in reply to nevent1q…5hqs
Author Public Key
npub1rjuxg0r8xsxh36myahl6qvzrz2l8ku88cf2ghxej3a2g5wsdlmjq880ac2Seen on
wss://relay.noswhere.comPublished at
2023-06-07 15:29:51Event JSON
{
"id": "df5f8d6a33a96e9718633de0cfae1d3c0cfca7841e921efb9712f2bd1ac29515",
"pubkey": "1cb8643c67340d78eb64edffa0304312be7b70e7c2548b9b328f548a3a0dfee4",
"created_at": 1686151791,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"5faa01afc6e1169d2a086249776b02fde5bfa851fa5197990b9cbcbf92c53f4a",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"c8ea87a172702476027902630860b6c1395f5fb0f53617be5bf155465c4ec48c",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"82205f272f995d9be742779a3c19a2ae08522ca14824c3a3b01525fb5459161e"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-02-05\n📝 Original message:The trust can be considered bootstrapped by visual verification of the address prefix. If we are really concerned about someone jamming a Bluetooth signal in a coffeeshop then the UI can encourage verification of the prefix. Much like how regular Bluetooth requires 'pairing' via entering a 4-6 digit code.\n\n\n \nPaul Puey CEO / Co-Founder, Airbitz Inc\n619.850.8624 | http://airbitz.co | San Diego\n \n\n\n\nOn Feb 5, 2015, at 3:46 PM, Eric Voskuil \u003ceric at voskuil.org\u003e wrote:\n\nOn 02/05/2015 03:36 PM, MⒶrtin HⒶboⓋštiak wrote:\n\u003e\u003e A BIP-70 signed payment request in the initial broadcast can resolve the\n\u003e\u003e integrity issues, but because of the public nature of the broadcast\n\u003e\u003e coupled with strong public identity, the privacy compromise is much\n\u003e\u003e worse. Now transactions are cryptographically tainted.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e This is also the problem with BIP-70 over the web. TLS and other\n\u003e\u003e security precautions aside, an interloper on the communication, desktop,\n\u003e\u003e datacenter, etc., can capture payment requests and strongly correlate\n\u003e\u003e transactions to identities in an automated manner. The payment request\n\u003e\u003e must be kept private between the parties, and that's hard to do.\n\u003e \n\u003e What about using encryption with forward secrecy? Merchant would\n\u003e generate signed request containing public ECDH part, buyer would send\n\u003e back transaction encrypted with ECDH and his public ECDH part. If\n\u003e receiving address/amount is meant to be private, use commit protocol\n\u003e (see ZRTP/RedPhone) and short authentication phrase (which is hard to\n\u003e spoof thanks to commit protocol - see RedPhone)?\n\nHi Martin,\n\nThe problem is that you need to verify the ownership of the public key.\nA MITM can substitute the key. If you don't have verifiable identity\nassociated with the public key (PKI/WoT), you need a shared secret (such\nas a secret phrase). But the problem is then establishing that secret\nover a public channel.\n\nYou can bootstrap a private session over the untrusted network using a\ntrusted public key (PKI/WoT). But the presumption is that you are\nalready doing this over the web (using TLS). That process is subject to\nattack at the CA. WoT is not subject to a CA attack, because it's\ndecentralized. But it's also not sufficiently deployed for some scenarios.\n\ne\n\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150205/6bf6a7d3/attachment.html\u003e",
"sig": "40cb442870fa9b0bae93384c70d61699a686b25206ca1ba1de621825e10cf05d410849882fc3ec8f3209435ec059bb0f7d650823b26db06c3142ce80778de31c"
}