📅 Original date posted:2015-10-20
📝 Original message:
On Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 04:55:04PM +1030, Rusty Russell wrote:
> Mats Jerratsch <matsjj at gmail.com> writes:
> > Think about an attacker who is able to MITM your internet connection,
> > like the hotspot you connect to at a Cafe (or your ISP if hijacked).
> > They can build locally a gigantic network, all pointing to the same
> > node. You can't tell, and they don't have to necessarily just block
> > your payments. (see above)
> >
> > I am mainly concerned over those. Especially since there is not really
> > anything we can do about dishonest nodes joining our network, but it's
> > encouraging to see your math. Since everything security-wise so far
> > stands only with knowing pubkeys of nodes actually connected to the
> > network, this should be the first thing to tackle. (that is, making it
> > expensive to attack it this way)
>
> Well, bitcoin protects from this using checkpoints, which are
> centralized. Because AFAICT there's no really good way of doing it.
Actually, I'd point out that checkpoints aren't as centralized as you'd
think! Checkpoints are set sufficiently far back in the past that if
they come into play for any reason other than initial bootstrapping, an
active attacker exists that has sufficient hashing power to destroy
Bitcoin anyway. Thus, checkpoints do *not* need consensus between
different implementations; my Bitcoin implementation can set a different
checkpoint than yours and both will work fine, except in the case of
massive attacks that Bitcoin can't survive anyway.
I probably should release a Bitcoin implementation with different
checkpoints than Bitcoin Core to make this point more clearly...
--
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
0000000000000000024918099cc7ec614db68e95d5f8b2b54fb5d06d33c764d9
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Peter Todd [ARCHIVE] /
npub1m2…a2np2
2023-06-09 12:44:51
in reply to nevent1q…vvpc
Author Public Key
npub1m230cem2yh3mtdzkg32qhj73uytgkyg5ylxsu083n3tpjnajxx4qqa2np2Published at
2023-06-09 12:44:51Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-10-20\n📝 Original message:\nOn Tue, Oct 20, 2015 at 04:55:04PM +1030, Rusty Russell wrote:\n\u003e Mats Jerratsch \u003cmatsjj at gmail.com\u003e writes:\n\u003e \u003e Think about an attacker who is able to MITM your internet connection,\n\u003e \u003e like the hotspot you connect to at a Cafe (or your ISP if hijacked).\n\u003e \u003e They can build locally a gigantic network, all pointing to the same\n\u003e \u003e node. You can't tell, and they don't have to necessarily just block\n\u003e \u003e your payments. (see above)\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e I am mainly concerned over those. Especially since there is not really\n\u003e \u003e anything we can do about dishonest nodes joining our network, but it's\n\u003e \u003e encouraging to see your math. Since everything security-wise so far\n\u003e \u003e stands only with knowing pubkeys of nodes actually connected to the\n\u003e \u003e network, this should be the first thing to tackle. (that is, making it\n\u003e \u003e expensive to attack it this way)\n\u003e \n\u003e Well, bitcoin protects from this using checkpoints, which are\n\u003e centralized. Because AFAICT there's no really good way of doing it.\n\nActually, I'd point out that checkpoints aren't as centralized as you'd\nthink! Checkpoints are set sufficiently far back in the past that if\nthey come into play for any reason other than initial bootstrapping, an\nactive attacker exists that has sufficient hashing power to destroy\nBitcoin anyway. Thus, checkpoints do *not* need consensus between\ndifferent implementations; my Bitcoin implementation can set a different\ncheckpoint than yours and both will work fine, except in the case of\nmassive attacks that Bitcoin can't survive anyway.\n\nI probably should release a Bitcoin implementation with different\ncheckpoints than Bitcoin Core to make this point more clearly...\n\n-- \n'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org\n0000000000000000024918099cc7ec614db68e95d5f8b2b54fb5d06d33c764d9\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: signature.asc\nType: application/pgp-signature\nSize: 650 bytes\nDesc: Digital signature\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20151020/c7053b57/attachment.sig\u003e",
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