Rusty Russell [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-10-05 📝 Original message: Anthony Towns <aj at ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-10-05
📝 Original message:
Anthony Towns <aj at erisian.com.au> writes:
> On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 03:18:39PM +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:
> Question:
>
> - I think this means lightning nodes are identified by the
> full 512 bit (or 257 bit?) public key used for routing -- (ie,
> knowing the HASH160 of the pubkey isn't enough, unlike in normal
> bitcoin pay2pubkey transactions).
Yes, since you need to encrypt to it, you need the full pubkey.
> - I think you can still use different keys for routing and
> anchors/commitments so far. (Using the anchor transaction to turn
> your routing id into a beacon would probably change that though)
Yes, that's still TBD.
>From the other email:
> - AES128 just uses the first half of the calculated enckey, iv and
> pad_iv
True.
> - since libsecp256k1 already sha256s the ecdh secret; the hmac/enckey/etc
> end up being sha256'ed twice (with a byte added in between). confused
> me for a minute.
I didn't notice that. Perhaps this is somewhere we should optimize?
Cheers,
Rusty.
PS. Message size of 128 bytes is completely made up, as is 20 hops. We
might want to reduce to 96 or 64 bytes.
Published at
2023-06-09 12:44:44Event JSON
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"created_at": 1686314684,
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-10-05\n📝 Original message:\nAnthony Towns \u003caj at erisian.com.au\u003e writes:\n\u003e On Fri, Oct 02, 2015 at 03:18:39PM +0930, Rusty Russell wrote:\n\u003e Question:\n\u003e\n\u003e - I think this means lightning nodes are identified by the\n\u003e full 512 bit (or 257 bit?) public key used for routing -- (ie,\n\u003e knowing the HASH160 of the pubkey isn't enough, unlike in normal\n\u003e bitcoin pay2pubkey transactions).\n\nYes, since you need to encrypt to it, you need the full pubkey.\n\n\u003e - I think you can still use different keys for routing and\n\u003e anchors/commitments so far. (Using the anchor transaction to turn\n\u003e your routing id into a beacon would probably change that though)\n\nYes, that's still TBD.\n\n\u003eFrom the other email:\n\n\u003e - AES128 just uses the first half of the calculated enckey, iv and\n\u003e pad_iv\n\nTrue.\n\n\u003e - since libsecp256k1 already sha256s the ecdh secret; the hmac/enckey/etc\n\u003e end up being sha256'ed twice (with a byte added in between). confused\n\u003e me for a minute.\n\nI didn't notice that. Perhaps this is somewhere we should optimize?\n\nCheers,\nRusty.\nPS. Message size of 128 bytes is completely made up, as is 20 hops. We\n might want to reduce to 96 or 64 bytes.",
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