📅 Original date posted:2014-02-25
📝 Original message:Am suggesting a (possible) mitigation of [possible flooding, etc], via
some kind of discussion (potentially process BIP, related to bundling and
/ or randomization) not now, but down the road. However, needs more
thought and analysis (you mentioned code audit?) before it could be
floated around or acted on in any way shape or form. Thanks for this
discussion, things to think about.... am watching, listening (...)
> There are two possibilities.
>
> One is that the value of transactions with the new lower fee is outweighed
> by increased orphan costs and miners refuse to include them en-masse.
> Wallet authors lose the staring match and go back to setting higher fees
> until such a time as block propagation is optimised and the orphan costs
> go
> down. Nodes that are encountering memory pressure can increase their min
> relay fee locally until their usage fits inside their resources. It's
> annoying to do this by hand but by no means infeasible.
>
> The other is that the total value of transactions even with the lower fee
> is not outweighed by orphan costs. The value of a transaction is higher
> than its simple monetary value - the fact that Bitcoin is useful, growing
> and considered cheap also has a value which is impossible to calculate,
> but
> we know it's there (because Bitcoin does not exist in a vacuum and has
> competitors). In this case miners stop including lots of useful
> transactions that represent desired economic activity and are put under
> pressure by the community to change their policies. If all miners do this
> and making small blocks is considered errant behaviour, then we're back to
> the same situation we're in today.
>
> The possibility you're worried about - that someone does a DoS attack by
> flooding the network with small transactions - is only an issue in the
> first situation, and it is by no means the easiest or cheapest way to DoS
> Bitcoin. We all want to see more DoS resistance but basically any change
> to
> Bitcoin can be objected to on anti-DoS grounds at the moment, and this
> will
> remain the case until someone steps up to spend significant time on
> resource scheduling and code audits.
>
Odinn Cyberguerrilla [ARCHIVE] /
npub18x…hg6zk
2023-06-07 15:14:04
in reply to nevent1q…aqv8
Author Public Key
npub18xqykhf26udeq2nyk98ee0a5q4w3s2f75m405a6zswpdy573lxeqmhg6zkPublished at
2023-06-07 15:14:04Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-02-25\n📝 Original message:Am suggesting a (possible) mitigation of [possible flooding, etc], via\nsome kind of discussion (potentially process BIP, related to bundling and\n/ or randomization) not now, but down the road. However, needs more\nthought and analysis (you mentioned code audit?) before it could be\nfloated around or acted on in any way shape or form. Thanks for this\ndiscussion, things to think about.... am watching, listening (...)\n\n\u003e There are two possibilities.\n\u003e\n\u003e One is that the value of transactions with the new lower fee is outweighed\n\u003e by increased orphan costs and miners refuse to include them en-masse.\n\u003e Wallet authors lose the staring match and go back to setting higher fees\n\u003e until such a time as block propagation is optimised and the orphan costs\n\u003e go\n\u003e down. Nodes that are encountering memory pressure can increase their min\n\u003e relay fee locally until their usage fits inside their resources. It's\n\u003e annoying to do this by hand but by no means infeasible.\n\u003e\n\u003e The other is that the total value of transactions even with the lower fee\n\u003e is not outweighed by orphan costs. The value of a transaction is higher\n\u003e than its simple monetary value - the fact that Bitcoin is useful, growing\n\u003e and considered cheap also has a value which is impossible to calculate,\n\u003e but\n\u003e we know it's there (because Bitcoin does not exist in a vacuum and has\n\u003e competitors). In this case miners stop including lots of useful\n\u003e transactions that represent desired economic activity and are put under\n\u003e pressure by the community to change their policies. If all miners do this\n\u003e and making small blocks is considered errant behaviour, then we're back to\n\u003e the same situation we're in today.\n\u003e\n\u003e The possibility you're worried about - that someone does a DoS attack by\n\u003e flooding the network with small transactions - is only an issue in the\n\u003e first situation, and it is by no means the easiest or cheapest way to DoS\n\u003e Bitcoin. We all want to see more DoS resistance but basically any change\n\u003e to\n\u003e Bitcoin can be objected to on anti-DoS grounds at the moment, and this\n\u003e will\n\u003e remain the case until someone steps up to spend significant time on\n\u003e resource scheduling and code audits.\n\u003e",
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