Eric Voskuil [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2019-07-06 📝 Original message:> On Jul 6, 2019, at ...

📅 Original date posted:2019-07-06
📝 Original message:> On Jul 6, 2019, at 03:12, Tamas Blummer <tamas.blummer at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>
>> On Jul 6, 2019, at 01:16, ZmnSCPxj <ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Good morning Eric,
>>
>>
>> Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email.
>>
>> ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
>> On Saturday, July 6, 2019 3:27 AM, Eric Voskuil <eric at voskuil.org> wrote:
>>
>>>> On Jul 4, 2019, at 21:05, ZmnSCPxj ZmnSCPxj at protonmail.com wrote:
>>>> Good morning Eric,
>>>>
>>>>> As with Bitcoin mining, it is the consumed cost that matters in this scenario, (i.e., not the hash rate, or in this case the encumbered coin face value). Why would the advertiser not simply be required to burn .1 coin for the same privilege, just as miners burn energy? Why would it not make more sense to spend that coin in support of the secondary network (e.g. paying for confirmation security), just as with the burning of energy in Bitcoin mining?
>>>
>>> Good morning ZmnSCPxj,
>>>
>>>> Using the unspentness-time of a UTXO allows for someone advertising a service or producer to "close up shop" by simply spending the advertising UTXO.
>>>> For instance, if the advertisement is for sale of a limited stock of goods, once the stock has been sold, the merchant (assuming the merchant used own funds) can simply recover the locked funds, with the potential to reinvest them elsewhere.
>>>> This allows some time-based hedging for the merchant (they may be willing to wait indefinitely for the stock to be sold, but once the stock is sold, they can immediately reap the rewards of not having their funds locked anymore).
>>>
>>> This is a materially different concept than proposed by Tamas.
>>>
>>> “...he gives up his control of the coins until maturity, he can not use them elsewhere until then.”
>>
>> Possibly.
>> In a way, this is giving up control of the coin, until he no longer needs the advertisement, i.e. dynamically select the maturity age needed.
>>
> My proposal would separate the owner of the funds from the one using the advertizement service.

No, it would not. I have seen no proposal requiring identity in the two roles, which is necessary to show that two distinct individuals operate in the roles. Furthermore, even identity would be insufficient, as two individuals can clearly collude in these roles.

> Yes, the owner lock up until maturity. But those using the UTXO for the advertizement service could transfer (sell) the UTXO to someone else as soon as they do not need it, so it is dynamic maturity for them The new owner could use them for an other advertizement or for an entirely different purpose.

Agree, and it is the unremovable time constraint that ensures the opportunity cost. This is why in your proposal it is of no consequence that both roles can be the same person.

> Regarding burning: I think burning is unsustainable as usage of services is unlimited while coin suply is limited.

Loss is perpetual, so this implies Bitcoin is unsustainable.

>>>
>>> And as I have shown above, nor can a “locked-up” coin be unlocked to do the same.
>>
>> You have shown no such thing, merely shown that you have not understood the proposal.
>>
>> Regards,
>> ZmnSCPxj
>
> I also struggle to communicate to Eric and likely many other reader the generic utility of temporary control of an UTXO. Let me try again:

No, you do not. This is not the point at issue. See my previous response.

> Bitcoin offers a memory with remarkable properties:
> - it can be read by anyone anywhere
> - anyone anywhere who knows a key controlling an UTXO, and only them, can initiate an update to the memory
> - global replicas guaranteed to apply updates of the memory within a short time period.
>
> This is a utility that is sufficient to implement money.

No, it isn’t. Ownership must be perpetually (actually) transferable, not just known. The use of a covenant breaks this transferability, see previous posts.

> Such a reliable shared memory could have however more uses than tracking money, It could keep track of, and thereby make scarce, arbitary other things.

For the same reason this cannot work for money, it cannot work for any perpetual asset. See previous posts.

> We can unlock these uses by separating the money use of memory from other uses.
>
> The covenant achives this separation temporarily. A UTXO with a covenant that guarantees that current owner re-gains control at a later time means,
> that the current owner temporarily forgoes the UTXOs use as money and thereby allows its temporary use to keep track of something else.

Only if the asset expires at or before the covenant maturity.

> UTXOs with different covenants or without covenant are not fungible.

Of course.

> Why use UTXOs of significant value to track something that is not money? Because the reason the registry is used is to create scarcity and scarcity can be tailored to more or
> less severe by requiring more or less satoshis to track something.

Only 1 satoshi is required for tracking. It is only the scarcity of a satoshi that creates this scarcity, not the covenant on it. The covenant represents only the destruction of opportunity of the value represented by the 1 satoshi, not a new system of scarcity.

> The current owner of a regular UTXO will want to be paid for temporarily giving up control, and that payment represents interest.

Yes, opportunity cost.

> Riskless, since it is certain to re-gain control.

But of no value to anyone as money.

Best,
Eric

> Regards,
>
> Tamas Blummer
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