📅 Original date posted:2015-07-01
📝 Original message:
Blargh. The dumb solution here is to just shrug and say that you have to
trust these processors to be highly available, and never try to do
re-routing. That's pretty much equivalent to what would happen if one of
the banks in the visa network had networking issues for example.
The big difference here though is that visa will kick you out of the
network if you're a bank that's consistently not meeting their
strict SLA's, and that keeps the network honest. There is no such central
processor though in this case to enforce the reputation of lightening nodes.
On Monday, June 29, 2015, Stephen Morse <stephencalebmorse at gmail.com> wrote:
> Hi Rusty,
>
> On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 2:41 AM, Rusty Russell <rusty at rustcorp.com.au
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','rusty at rustcorp.com.au');>> wrote:
>
>>
>> Yes, C can just get the preimage from E and collude to steal the funds,
>> which is a nasty failure mode.
>>
>>
> This scenario may even happen non-maliciously, if C has an honest outage
> and attempts to pick up where it left off on each of its channels. To fix
> the non-malicious case, C could get a refund from E (a new signed
> transaction with a lower lock time), if C knows he has been offline for
> longer than B's willingness to wait before re-routing. But this isn't
> perfect, or even good, because E cannot know that C isn't just trying to
> get a refund even though they have taken the payment from B. In fact, C is
> guaranteed the payment from B, since they have the pre-image.
>
>
>> Delaying the entire payment is a poor option; can anyone see a better
>> one?
>>
>
> Like you say, delaying the payment seems like a bad way to go, as then the
> payments wouldn't be quite "Lightning" fast anymore. 99% of the payment
> could be re-routed though. Perhaps the 99% could be re-routed, while A
> waits for C to rejoin. Or if multiple paths are being used to process the
> payment, just redistribute the remaining payments allotted for the broken
> path among the other functioning paths.
>
> The bigger problem here seems to be that the incentives are slightly
> skewed in favor of dishonestly. One can minimize the impact of that
> dishonesty by breaking the payment into smaller chunks and across diverse
> paths, but this comes at the cost of bandwidth and speed. Some sort of a
> rating system could come into play possibly, if nothing can be
> cryptographically worked out.
>
> Best,
> Stephen
>
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Kevin Greene [ARCHIVE] /
npub1l3…hwq5p
2023-06-09 12:43:29
in reply to nevent1q…4jrq
Author Public Key
npub1l3sj8amnurgf3cu3p2hhcaham90khafc4vgsmymqdnn0k3kanulsghwq5pPublished at
2023-06-09 12:43:29Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-07-01\n📝 Original message:\nBlargh. The dumb solution here is to just shrug and say that you have to\ntrust these processors to be highly available, and never try to do\nre-routing. That's pretty much equivalent to what would happen if one of\nthe banks in the visa network had networking issues for example.\n\nThe big difference here though is that visa will kick you out of the\nnetwork if you're a bank that's consistently not meeting their\nstrict SLA's, and that keeps the network honest. There is no such central\nprocessor though in this case to enforce the reputation of lightening nodes.\n\n\nOn Monday, June 29, 2015, Stephen Morse \u003cstephencalebmorse at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Hi Rusty,\n\u003e\n\u003e On Sat, Jun 27, 2015 at 2:41 AM, Rusty Russell \u003crusty at rustcorp.com.au\n\u003e \u003cjavascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','rusty at rustcorp.com.au');\u003e\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Yes, C can just get the preimage from E and collude to steal the funds,\n\u003e\u003e which is a nasty failure mode.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e This scenario may even happen non-maliciously, if C has an honest outage\n\u003e and attempts to pick up where it left off on each of its channels. To fix\n\u003e the non-malicious case, C could get a refund from E (a new signed\n\u003e transaction with a lower lock time), if C knows he has been offline for\n\u003e longer than B's willingness to wait before re-routing. But this isn't\n\u003e perfect, or even good, because E cannot know that C isn't just trying to\n\u003e get a refund even though they have taken the payment from B. In fact, C is\n\u003e guaranteed the payment from B, since they have the pre-image.\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Delaying the entire payment is a poor option; can anyone see a better\n\u003e\u003e one?\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Like you say, delaying the payment seems like a bad way to go, as then the\n\u003e payments wouldn't be quite \"Lightning\" fast anymore. 99% of the payment\n\u003e could be re-routed though. Perhaps the 99% could be re-routed, while A\n\u003e waits for C to rejoin. Or if multiple paths are being used to process the\n\u003e payment, just redistribute the remaining payments allotted for the broken\n\u003e path among the other functioning paths.\n\u003e\n\u003e The bigger problem here seems to be that the incentives are slightly\n\u003e skewed in favor of dishonestly. One can minimize the impact of that\n\u003e dishonesty by breaking the payment into smaller chunks and across diverse\n\u003e paths, but this comes at the cost of bandwidth and speed. Some sort of a\n\u003e rating system could come into play possibly, if nothing can be\n\u003e cryptographically worked out.\n\u003e\n\u003e Best,\n\u003e Stephen\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20150701/9c344b96/attachment.html\u003e",
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