📅 Original date posted:2015-09-03
📝 Original message:On 9/2/2015 9:05 PM, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Schemes proposing to pay with difficulty / hashpower to change block
> size should be avoided. The miners incentive has always been fairly
> straightforward - it is rational to deploy new hashpower as soon as
> you can get it online. Introducing the concepts of (a) requiring
> out-of-band collusion to change block size and/or (b) requiring miners
> to have idle hashpower on hand to change block size are both
> unrealistic and potentially corrosive. That potentially makes the
> block size - and therefore fee market - too close, too sensitive to
> the wild vagaries of the mining chip market.
>
> Pay-to-future-miner has neutral, forward looking incentives worth
> researching.
>
Another market dependency is even more direct.
Blocksize that can be bought with either difficulty or bitcoin has
incentives whose strength (though not direction) is subject to the
exchange rate. Hence those incentives are subject to the whims of fiat
holders, who can push the exchange rate around.
Tom Harding [ARCHIVE] /
npub1ms…pmwjy
2023-06-07 17:39:28
in reply to nevent1q…v022
Author Public Key
npub1msef5qkfwz4t7qacwxz775wgdtlytph78g2g2z903x90874u263sypmwjyPublished at
2023-06-07 17:39:28Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-09-03\n📝 Original message:On 9/2/2015 9:05 PM, Jeff Garzik via bitcoin-dev wrote:\n\u003e Schemes proposing to pay with difficulty / hashpower to change block \n\u003e size should be avoided. The miners incentive has always been fairly \n\u003e straightforward - it is rational to deploy new hashpower as soon as \n\u003e you can get it online. Introducing the concepts of (a) requiring \n\u003e out-of-band collusion to change block size and/or (b) requiring miners \n\u003e to have idle hashpower on hand to change block size are both \n\u003e unrealistic and potentially corrosive. That potentially makes the \n\u003e block size - and therefore fee market - too close, too sensitive to \n\u003e the wild vagaries of the mining chip market.\n\u003e\n\u003e Pay-to-future-miner has neutral, forward looking incentives worth \n\u003e researching.\n\u003e\n\nAnother market dependency is even more direct.\n\nBlocksize that can be bought with either difficulty or bitcoin has \nincentives whose strength (though not direction) is subject to the \nexchange rate. Hence those incentives are subject to the whims of fiat \nholders, who can push the exchange rate around.",
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