Bastien TEINTURIER [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2020-10-08 📝 Original message: Thanks (again) Antoine ...

📅 Original date posted:2020-10-08
📝 Original message:
Thanks (again) Antoine and Zman for your answers,

On the other hand, a quick skim of your proposal suggests that it still
> respects the "initiator pays" principle.
> Basically, the fundee only pays fees for HTLCs they initiated, which is
> not relevant to the above attack (since in the above attack, my node is a
> dead end, you will never send out an HTLC through my channel to rebalance).
> So it should still be acceptable.


I agree, my proposal would have the same result as today's behavior in that
case.
Unless your throw-away node waited for me to add an HTLC in its channel, in
that case I would pay a
part of the fee (since I'm adding that HTLC). That leans towards the first
of my two proposals,
where the funder always pays the "base" fee and htlc fees are split
depending on who proposed the HTLC.

The channel initiator shouldn't have to pay for channel-closing as it's
> somehow a liquidity allocation decision


I agree 100%. Especially since mutual closing should be preferred most of
the time.

That said, a channel closing might be triggered due to a security
> mechanism, like a HTLC to timeout onchain. Thus a malicious counterparty
> can easily loop a HTLC forwarding on an honest peer. Then not cancel it
> on-time to force the honest counterparty to pay onchain fees to avoid a
> offered HTLC not being claimed back on time.


Yes, this is an issue, but the only way to fix it today is to never be the
funder, always be fundee
and I think that creates unhealthy, assymetric incentives.

This is a scenario where the other node will only burn you once; if you
notice that behavior you'll
be forced to pay on-chain fees, but you'll ban this peer. And if he opened
the channel to you, he'll
still be paying the "base" fee. I don't think there's a silver bullet here
where you can completely
avoid being bitten by such malicious nodes, but you can reduce exposure and
ban them after the fact.

Another note on using a minimal relay fee; in a potential future where
on-chain fees are always
high and layer 1 is consistently busy, even that minimal relay fee will be
costly. You'll want your
peer to pay for the HTLCs it's responsible for to split the on-chain fee
more fairly. So I believe
moving (slightly) away from the "funder pays all" model is desirable (or at
least it's worth
exploring seriously in order to have a better reason to dismiss it than
"it's simpler").

Does that make sense?

Thanks,
Bastien

Le mar. 6 oct. 2020 à 18:30, Antoine Riard <antoine.riard at gmail.com> a
écrit :

> Hello Bastien,
>
> I'm all in for a model where channel transactions are pre-signed with a
> reasonable minimal relay fee and the adjustment is done by the closer. The
> channel initiator shouldn't have to pay for channel-closing as it's somehow
> a liquidity allocation decision ("My balance could be better allocated
> elsewhere than in this channel").
>
> That said, a channel closing might be triggered due to a security
> mechanism, like a HTLC to timeout onchain. Thus a malicious counterparty
> can easily loop a HTLC forwarding on an honest peer. Then not cancel it
> on-time to force the honest counterparty to pay onchain fees to avoid a
> offered HTLC not being claimed back on time.
>
> AFAICT, this issue is not solved by anchor outputs. A way to decentivize
> this kind of behavior from a malicious counterparty is an upfront payment
> where the upholding HTLC fee * HTLC block-buffer-before-onchain is higher
> than the cost of going onchain. It should cost higher for the counterparty
> to withhold a HTLC than paying onchain-fees to close the channel.
>
> Or can you think about another mitigation for the issue raised above ?
>
> Antoine
>
> Le lun. 5 oct. 2020 à 09:13, Bastien TEINTURIER via Lightning-dev <
> lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> a écrit :
>
>> Good morning list,
>>
>> It seems to me that the "funder pays all the commit tx fees" rule exists
>> solely for simplicity
>> (which was totally reasonable). I haven't been able to find much
>> discussion about this decision
>> on the mailing list nor in the spec commits.
>>
>> At first glance, it's true that at the beginning of the channel lifetime,
>> the funder should be
>> responsible for the fee (it's his decision to open a channel after all).
>> But as time goes by and
>> both peers earn value from this channel, this rule becomes questionable.
>> We've discovered since
>> then that there is some risk associated with having pending HTLCs
>> (flood-and-loot type of attacks,
>> pinning, channel jamming, etc).
>>
>> I think that *in some cases*, fundees should be paying a portion of the
>> commit-tx on-chain fees,
>> otherwise we may end up with a web-of-trust network where channels would
>> only exist between peers
>> that trust each other, which is quite limiting (I'm hoping we can do
>> better).
>>
>> Routing nodes may be at risk when they *receive* HTLCs. All the attacks
>> that steal funds come from
>> the fact that a routing node has paid downstream but cannot claim the
>> upstream HTLCs (correct me
>> if that's incorrect). Thus I'd like nodes to pay for the on-chain fees of
>> the HTLCs they offer
>> while they're pending in the commit-tx, regardless of whether they're
>> funder or fundee.
>>
>> The simplest way to do this would be to deduce the HTLC cost (172 *
>> feerate) from the offerer's
>> main output (instead of the funder's main output, while keeping the base
>> commit tx weight paid
>> by the funder).
>>
>> A more extreme proposal would be to tie the *total* commit-tx fee to the
>> channel usage:
>>
>> * if there are no pending HTLCs, the funder pays all the fee
>> * if there are pending HTLCs, each node pays a proportion of the fee
>> proportional to the number of
>> HTLCs they offered. If Alice offered 1 HTLC and Bob offered 3 HTLCs, Bob
>> pays 75% of the
>> commit-tx fee and Alice pays 25%. When the HTLCs settle, the fee is
>> redistributed.
>>
>> This model uses the on-chain fee as collateral for usage of the channel.
>> If Alice wants to forward
>> HTLCs through this channel (because she has something to gain - routing
>> fees), she should be taking
>> on some of the associated risk, not Bob. Bob will be taking the same risk
>> downstream if he chooses
>> to forward.
>>
>> I believe it also forces the fundee to care about on-chain feerates,
>> which is a healthy incentive.
>> It may create a feedback loop between on-chain feerates and routing fees,
>> which I believe is also
>> a good long-term thing (but it's hard to predict as there may be negative
>> side-effects as well).
>>
>> What do you all think? Is this a terrible idea? Is it okay-ish, but not
>> worth the additional
>> complexity? Is it an amazing idea worth a lightning nobel? Please don't
>> take any of my claims
>> for granted and challenge them, there may be negative side-effects I'm
>> completely missing, this is
>> a fragile game of incentives...
>>
>> Side-note: don't forget to take into account that the fees for HTLC
>> transactions (second-level txs)
>> are always paid by the party that broadcasts them (which makes sense). I
>> still think this is not
>> enough and can even be abused by fundees in some setups.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> Bastien
>> _______________________________________________
>> Lightning-dev mailing list
>> Lightning-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
>>
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/lightning-dev/attachments/20201008/45ed00b7/attachment.html>;