📅 Original date posted:2016-08-10
📝 Original message:Signed by the key pair that was referenced in the output of the on-chain
transaction? (Bob in my example, actually) Doesn't that mean it's easy to
follow who is paying whom, you just can't see how much is going to reach
recipient?
On Tue, Aug 9, 2016, 04:40 Tony Churyumoff <tony991 at gmail.com> wrote:
> This troll is harmless. A duplicate spend proof should also be signed
> by the same user (Alice, in your example) to be considered a double
> spend.
>
> 2016-08-09 3:18 GMT+03:00 James MacWhyte <macwhyte at gmail.com>:
> > One more thought about why verification by miners may be needed.
> >
> > Let's say Alice sends Bob a transaction, generating output C.
> >
> > A troll, named Timothy, broadcasts a transaction with a random hash,
> > referencing C's output as its spend proof. The miners can't tell if it's
> > valid or not, and so they include the transaction in a block. Now Bob's
> > money is useless, because everyone can see the spend proof referenced and
> > thinks it has already been spent, even though the transaction that
> claims it
> > isn't valid.
> >
> > Did I miss something that protects against this?
> >
>
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20160810/718af0de/attachment.html>;
James MacWhyte [ARCHIVE] /
npub12t…pye9h
2023-06-07 17:52:29
in reply to nevent1q…24h5
Author Public Key
npub12tjaqer27049ejmvf0f3yd7kq6p93gg6ecavgrczge4rlzf59y5q2pye9hPublished at
2023-06-07 17:52:29Event JSON
{
"id": "5d1878c45b739cd5316187f036333113b5f6398aa90a1ace15435ea9d5ecc06d",
"pubkey": "52e5d0646af3ea5ccb6c4bd31237d6068258a11ace3ac40f02466a3f89342928",
"created_at": 1686160349,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"ae333d0f17a38f0d93813c9365e2b4c52ff978cb9edb0ac873b1bbe342d91c71",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"6127b2ebeb18c0aa56a03876bc742db7e6517ba11665d08ab1778990f5da1432",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"52e5d0646af3ea5ccb6c4bd31237d6068258a11ace3ac40f02466a3f89342928"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2016-08-10\n📝 Original message:Signed by the key pair that was referenced in the output of the on-chain\ntransaction? (Bob in my example, actually) Doesn't that mean it's easy to\nfollow who is paying whom, you just can't see how much is going to reach\nrecipient?\n\nOn Tue, Aug 9, 2016, 04:40 Tony Churyumoff \u003ctony991 at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e This troll is harmless. A duplicate spend proof should also be signed\n\u003e by the same user (Alice, in your example) to be considered a double\n\u003e spend.\n\u003e\n\u003e 2016-08-09 3:18 GMT+03:00 James MacWhyte \u003cmacwhyte at gmail.com\u003e:\n\u003e \u003e One more thought about why verification by miners may be needed.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Let's say Alice sends Bob a transaction, generating output C.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e A troll, named Timothy, broadcasts a transaction with a random hash,\n\u003e \u003e referencing C's output as its spend proof. The miners can't tell if it's\n\u003e \u003e valid or not, and so they include the transaction in a block. Now Bob's\n\u003e \u003e money is useless, because everyone can see the spend proof referenced and\n\u003e \u003e thinks it has already been spent, even though the transaction that\n\u003e claims it\n\u003e \u003e isn't valid.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e Did I miss something that protects against this?\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20160810/718af0de/attachment.html\u003e",
"sig": "65736452b1e4399d6753b02958e6897b2abaf595e3ff8f63b019df47d52dde7fb05db20c2f6bd88f975123b4c61b50fe69c7fa882b00285d8f2e04672892efdc"
}