📅 Original date posted:2015-07-26
📝 Original message:
On Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 10:59:16PM +0200, Christopher Jamthagen wrote:
> <div>According to the whitepaper: " If three days have elapsed,
> then the above clause is null and void and the clearing process is
> invalidated, both parties must not attempt to settle and claim payment
> after three days." But clearly there is nothing stopping Bob from
> taking the HTLC output when Alice is forced to broadcast the
> commitment transaction, even if it is supposed to be null and
> void.</div>
Hi Christopher,
The design of the HTLCs have a contestation period built-in where the
party which broadcasts the Commitment Transaction must wait a period of
time before the payment goes back to themselves.
I think your concern may have some implications for Rusty's dual
anchor/funding version. I had incorrectly stated that it might be
possible to do it only with OP_CLTV, but it clearly requires both
OP_CLTV and OP_CSV.
There's more information being attested when relying on OP_CSV for the
HTLC without a transaction chained 2 levels deep. It will require
greater time delay between each hop in the payment to account for the
relative time to prove whether the Commitment has been revoked. This
greater time creates a tradeoff which requires each channel participant
(for every hop) to watch the blockchain at a more frequent interval,
since that OP_CSV value is intrinsically linked to the payment.
With a SIGHASH_NOINPUT (or similar) model having transactions two-deep,
this contestation period can be independent of the actual HTLC payments.
In effect, the first transaction spending from the HTLC validates
whether the preimages are known, the second is whether the Commitment
itself is invalidated. With separated anchor/funding, those two steps
are combined inside the Commitment Transaction -- AFAIK, (minus the
above tradeoffs) it still works though, but I'll double-check.
--
Joseph Poon
Joseph Poon [ARCHIVE] /
npub1ej…p9cq8
2023-06-09 12:43:46
in reply to nevent1q…2vxg
Author Public Key
npub1ej6vep7y2km5l6awukffelg8yeppkth2vjkjk9jypd5w336rxggs3p9cq8Published at
2023-06-09 12:43:46Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-07-26\n📝 Original message:\nOn Sat, Jul 25, 2015 at 10:59:16PM +0200, Christopher Jamthagen wrote:\n\u003e \u003cdiv\u003eAccording to the whitepaper: \u0026quot; If three days have elapsed,\n\u003e then the above clause is null and void and the clearing process is\n\u003e invalidated, both parties must not attempt to settle and claim payment\n\u003e after three days.\u0026quot; But clearly there is nothing stopping Bob from\n\u003e taking the HTLC output when Alice is forced to broadcast the\n\u003e commitment transaction, even if it is supposed to be null and\n\u003e void.\u003c/div\u003e\n\nHi Christopher,\n\nThe design of the HTLCs have a contestation period built-in where the\nparty which broadcasts the Commitment Transaction must wait a period of\ntime before the payment goes back to themselves.\n\nI think your concern may have some implications for Rusty's dual\nanchor/funding version. I had incorrectly stated that it might be\npossible to do it only with OP_CLTV, but it clearly requires both\nOP_CLTV and OP_CSV.\n\nThere's more information being attested when relying on OP_CSV for the\nHTLC without a transaction chained 2 levels deep. It will require\ngreater time delay between each hop in the payment to account for the\nrelative time to prove whether the Commitment has been revoked. This\ngreater time creates a tradeoff which requires each channel participant\n(for every hop) to watch the blockchain at a more frequent interval,\nsince that OP_CSV value is intrinsically linked to the payment.\n\nWith a SIGHASH_NOINPUT (or similar) model having transactions two-deep,\nthis contestation period can be independent of the actual HTLC payments.\nIn effect, the first transaction spending from the HTLC validates\nwhether the preimages are known, the second is whether the Commitment\nitself is invalidated. With separated anchor/funding, those two steps\nare combined inside the Commitment Transaction -- AFAIK, (minus the\nabove tradeoffs) it still works though, but I'll double-check.\n\n-- \nJoseph Poon",
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