📅 Original date posted:2021-05-25
📝 Original message:Your analysis is correct.
In perfect competition, profits tend to zero, which means the costs of
mining tend to equal the reward.
Since the reward is fees plus subsidy, reducing the subsidy should reduce
mining costs.
I think convincing other users we need such a softfork to reeuce the
subsidy is going to be hard though.
Even among developers, these proposals seem to be kind of taboo, because
people tene to perceive them as "attacking miners".
Sadly the notion that miners decide consensus rules is pretty extended even
among developers. The recent bip8(true) vs bip8(false) discussions are
anundant evidence that this is the case. Most devs perceive that not giving
miners veto power over proposals somehow means that then developers become
dictators who can unilaterally decide the rules.
They don't accept the fact that it's users who decide the consensus rules.
For them, if it's not miners who decide, then it must be devs. That's
because they see users as a bunch of uninformed imbeciles who can't
understand anything or decide anything. And yet this arrogant position is
coming from people who seemingly don't understand section 11 of the
whitepaper when it says "even with a hashrate majority, that doesn't allow
one to arbitrarily change the rules or forge signatures" which can be
summarized to "miners DO NOT decide the rules.
Given these deeps misunderstandings, most devs (and who knows how many
users) will consider a softfork to reduce mining subsidy "impossible, since
miners will oppose it".
This incredibly sad situation is where we're at.
I personally would be in favor of a softfork to reduce the subsidy. That
would hopefully pacify some of the people concerned with bitcoin's energy
consumption. Bitcoin ecologists should defend this and not "proof of stake"
and other technical nonsense.
On Mon, May 24, 2021, 21:32 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Before we can decide on tradeoffs that reduce security in favor of less
> energy usage, or less inflation, or whatever goal you might have for
> reducing (or delaying) coinbase rewards, we need to decide as a community
> how much security bitcoin *needs*.
>
> Do we need to be secure against an attacker with a budget of $1
> billion/year for an attack? $10 billion/year? More?
>
> An upper limit would be the budget of the largest government: the US. The
> US federal budget is almost $5 trillion/year. But they certainly couldn't
> spend all that budget attacking bitcoin. About $3 trillion of that is
> mandatory spending, which couldn't be allocated to such an attack. About
> $1.5 trillion is discretionary, which includes the military budget. It
> seems like an upper limit on the amount that could be siphoned from that
> budget to attack bitcoin would be 5%. That would take massive political
> cooperation and wheeling and dealing. Likely spending that much would not
> be politically feasible, but it seems possible, since a 5% reduction in
> other activities is something other departments would likely be able to
> sustain with just a bit of downsizing. Or that money could simply come from
> more borrowing. 5% of $1.5 trillion is $75 billion. So that seems like a
> pretty solid upper limit on the amount the US could allocate to an attack
> in a year, in that it seems incredibly unlikely that more money than that
> could be allocated. Such an expenditure might be eventually seen as
> justified since the federal reserve has been inflating the supply of
> dollars by 17.5% on average every year, which would be $1 trillion next
> year (and more the next, etc). A similar story is told if you calculate the
> amount of seigniorage banks get access to by their ability to use
> fractional reserve to inflate the supply of M2 money. It should be
> considered tho that this seigniorage doesn't give its beneficiaries that
> full value, but rather some fraction of that value - say 5% earned by being
> first to buy with that new money and earning interest on it. So 5% of a
> trillion is $50 billion. Still, over just two years, that's enough to pay
> for an attack of at least that size ($75 billion).
>
> The budget for the government of China is about $3.6 trillion, the second
> largest in the world. And since they're an authoritarian country, they can
> basically do whatever they want with that money. It still seems unlikely
> they would spend more than 5% of that budget on doing something like
> attacking bitcoin. However, consider that China's M2 money supply has been
> increasing at a rate of almost $3 trillion per year. Protecting the ability
> to do this is seems like something worth spending some (printed) money on.
> So perhaps at some point, spending 10 or 20% of their budget for a year or
> two to attack bitcoin might seem like a good idea to some mickey mouse in
> the government. That would be $720 billion/year.
>
> So given the amount of seigniorage taken in every year by these central
> banks, it would seem to justify large expenditures. I'm not sure how
> realistic it would be, politically speaking, to gather $720 billion in a
> single year to attack bitcoin. It seems far fetched, even if the
> seigniorage they're protecting seems to justify it.
>
> So is this the level of attack we want to be resilient to? Nearly a $1
> trillion attack? I don't know. But we should figure that out as a
> community. And keep in mind, the level of attack we need to defend against
> depends on the size of bitcoin. The more valuable bitcoins are, the more
> damaging, more lucrative, and more valuable an attack would be for
> attackers. Its seems reasonable to assume that this is a linear
> relationship - that if bitcoins are worth twice as much, we need twice as
> much security (ie we want to make attacking bitcoin twice as costly).
>
> The next step is figuring out a reasonable lower bound for how much it
> takes to attack bitcoin. There are many attacks that can be done on
> bitcoin, but the one relevant to the discussion here is a 51% attack.
> Bitcoin's PoW basically is attackable buy buying about 25% of the existing
> mining power (for reasons like the selfish economic attack
> <https://github.com/fresheneesz/quantificationOfConsensusProtocolSecurity#the-selfish-economic-attack>; and
> the economic mining monopoly attack
> <https://github.com/fresheneesz/quantificationOfConsensusProtocolSecurity#economic-mining-monopoly-attack>;),
> which is about 40 exahashes/second.
>
> If you bought 400,000 WhatsMiner M30S+ rigs
> <https://www.buybitcoinworldwide.com/mining/hardware/>; at current market
> price, you'd need $1 billion to buy them all (which doesn't include the
> cost of setting up all that equipment, powering it, building the network
> infrastructure for it, etc etc). Let's say all that infra doubles the price
> to $2 billion. Even then, you couldn't simply buy half a million mining
> rigs from the market. That many just aren't available. An attacker would
> have to spend year and years building up their mining operation before they
> could actually perform the attack. They'd basically have to mine at a
> slight (probably insignificant) loss for that time. Their demand would push
> up the price of these mining rigs for at least a year or two until supply
> comes up to meet it. So lets say this doubles the price of the mining rigs
> (it could very well do significantly more than that). That makes for $3
> billion to build up this malicious mining operation. China could seize a
> mining pool, but likely couldn't do it quietly. They'd have to seize the
> pool and immediately use it to attack before miners stop using the pool
> (which might take a week or two). Maybe this would save them half the cost?
>
> So, lower bound on cost of attack is $1.5 billion. Upper bound on US govt
> attack is $72 billion. Upper bound on China govt attack is $720 billion. So
> based on this back-of-the-napkin line of thinking, its not super clear that
> reducing bitcoin's security is "enough" yet. There is also the question of:
> does a $1 trillion currency need to be secure against a $720 billion
> attack? Probably not. But should it be secure against a $10 billion attack?
> Maybe.
>
> However, the security will go up with price. If bitcoin goes up by 10x, as
> it is wont to do, that's nearly 10x the security (nearly, since coinbase
> rewards 10x, but the real value of fees almost certainly wouldn't go up as
> much). So that brings us to $15 billion of security. Still not clear
> without doing some more accurate analysis to determine more confidence in
> tighter bounds on cost of attack and likely attack budgets.
>
> But it certainly seems likely that my attack cost bounds are an order of
> magnitude too low, and its equally possible my estimates of potential
> available attack budgets are an order of magnitude too high. It doesn't
> seem quite as likely the reverse is true (that my bounds aren't good
> bounds).
>
> It seems possible that we currently have enough security, but seems
> likelier that we don't. It just isn't clear to me. Maybe someone has done
> some more accurate analysis that could help here.
>
> But before we talk about whether we should reduce our security to save
> costs, we need to determine how much security we need and how much security
> we have. Without good estimates with confident bounds, we simply can't make
> an informed decision to reduce security.
>
> > I don't think 99% of transactions need that level of security
>
> Well you can't get security for the 1% of transactions that need it
> without giving that security to all transactions on the chain. Also, the
> blockchain security created by miners isn't really a per transaction thing
> anyway. An attack would affect all bitcoins regardless of what transactions
> they do or do not take part in.
>
> On Sun, May 23, 2021 at 9:52 AM Karl via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>> >> The turn-around time for that takes a population of both users and
>> >> miners to cause. Increasing popularity of bitcoin has a far bigger
>> >> impact here, and it is already raising fees and energy use at an
>> >> established rate.
>> >>
>> >> If it becomes an issue, as bandwidth increases block size could be
>> >> raised to lower fees.
>> >>
>> >
>> > Which increases block rewards somewhat (at least to some level that
>> matches
>> > the overall security of the network) and you still have the same amount
>> of
>> > energy consumed.
>>
>> If you mean to implicitly propose that even if halved all the way with
>> very large blocks, block rewards would just increase to the same
>> level, meaning that any attempt to decrease them has no effect, I
>> disagree. I expect that if you raise the block size, eventually
>> there is so much supply for transactions that there are no fees at all
>> (nor security). The numbers are all things the devs, miners, and
>> users can together control.
>>
>> > How to prove this is not happening?
>> > The best you can do is to have some number of authorities sign off on
>> > whether or not they are doing this.
>> > The problem is that authorities are bribeable.
>>
>> You could make the proof of work be a proof of environmental kindness
>> by coding incentives for people to place and verify proof on the
>> chain, and then rewarding people for acting on it as desired. You
>> could code the chain to pay people to investigate and prove miners'
>> business practices, for example. You could define the main chain as
>> one where everyone consents the proofs are valid. There are a lot of
>> issues to resolve and it would be a very different chain.
>>
>> There is not a single solution here. There are innumerable possible
>> solutions, any one of which could be made to work with enough brains
>> working on it. To use one, we need to agree on what kinds of
>> solutions are acceptable.
>>
>> > Alternately, other entities in the locality can use force to require the
>> > polluting entity to clean up or suffer significant consequences.
>> > This at least is better incentive-wise, as they others in the same
>> locality
>> > are the ones most affected, but the ability to enforce may be difficult
>> due
>> > to various political constructions; the miners could be in such deep
>> cahoots
>> > with the local government that the local government would willingly hurt
>> > other local entities in the vicinity of the polluting entity.
>>
>> As bitcoin grows, if people ask some locality to enforce behavior,
>> they may need to be willing to enforce it themselves, too, or they
>> might outcompete the locality.
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>>
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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Jorge Timón [ARCHIVE] /
npub1fx…cl2d8
2023-06-07 22:54:01
in reply to nevent1q…fu55
Author Public Key
npub1fx98zxt3lzspjs5f4msr0fxysx5euucm29ghysryju7vpc9j0jzqtcl2d8Published at
2023-06-07 22:54:01Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2021-05-25\n📝 Original message:Your analysis is correct.\nIn perfect competition, profits tend to zero, which means the costs of\nmining tend to equal the reward.\nSince the reward is fees plus subsidy, reducing the subsidy should reduce\nmining costs.\n\nI think convincing other users we need such a softfork to reeuce the\nsubsidy is going to be hard though.\nEven among developers, these proposals seem to be kind of taboo, because\npeople tene to perceive them as \"attacking miners\".\nSadly the notion that miners decide consensus rules is pretty extended even\namong developers. The recent bip8(true) vs bip8(false) discussions are\nanundant evidence that this is the case. Most devs perceive that not giving\nminers veto power over proposals somehow means that then developers become\ndictators who can unilaterally decide the rules.\nThey don't accept the fact that it's users who decide the consensus rules.\nFor them, if it's not miners who decide, then it must be devs. That's\nbecause they see users as a bunch of uninformed imbeciles who can't\nunderstand anything or decide anything. And yet this arrogant position is\ncoming from people who seemingly don't understand section 11 of the\nwhitepaper when it says \"even with a hashrate majority, that doesn't allow\none to arbitrarily change the rules or forge signatures\" which can be\nsummarized to \"miners DO NOT decide the rules.\n\nGiven these deeps misunderstandings, most devs (and who knows how many\nusers) will consider a softfork to reduce mining subsidy \"impossible, since\nminers will oppose it\".\nThis incredibly sad situation is where we're at.\n\nI personally would be in favor of a softfork to reduce the subsidy. That\nwould hopefully pacify some of the people concerned with bitcoin's energy\nconsumption. Bitcoin ecologists should defend this and not \"proof of stake\"\nand other technical nonsense.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nOn Mon, May 24, 2021, 21:32 Billy Tetrud via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Before we can decide on tradeoffs that reduce security in favor of less\n\u003e energy usage, or less inflation, or whatever goal you might have for\n\u003e reducing (or delaying) coinbase rewards, we need to decide as a community\n\u003e how much security bitcoin *needs*.\n\u003e\n\u003e Do we need to be secure against an attacker with a budget of $1\n\u003e billion/year for an attack? $10 billion/year? More?\n\u003e\n\u003e An upper limit would be the budget of the largest government: the US. The\n\u003e US federal budget is almost $5 trillion/year. But they certainly couldn't\n\u003e spend all that budget attacking bitcoin. About $3 trillion of that is\n\u003e mandatory spending, which couldn't be allocated to such an attack. About\n\u003e $1.5 trillion is discretionary, which includes the military budget. It\n\u003e seems like an upper limit on the amount that could be siphoned from that\n\u003e budget to attack bitcoin would be 5%. That would take massive political\n\u003e cooperation and wheeling and dealing. Likely spending that much would not\n\u003e be politically feasible, but it seems possible, since a 5% reduction in\n\u003e other activities is something other departments would likely be able to\n\u003e sustain with just a bit of downsizing. Or that money could simply come from\n\u003e more borrowing. 5% of $1.5 trillion is $75 billion. So that seems like a\n\u003e pretty solid upper limit on the amount the US could allocate to an attack\n\u003e in a year, in that it seems incredibly unlikely that more money than that\n\u003e could be allocated. Such an expenditure might be eventually seen as\n\u003e justified since the federal reserve has been inflating the supply of\n\u003e dollars by 17.5% on average every year, which would be $1 trillion next\n\u003e year (and more the next, etc). A similar story is told if you calculate the\n\u003e amount of seigniorage banks get access to by their ability to use\n\u003e fractional reserve to inflate the supply of M2 money. It should be\n\u003e considered tho that this seigniorage doesn't give its beneficiaries that\n\u003e full value, but rather some fraction of that value - say 5% earned by being\n\u003e first to buy with that new money and earning interest on it. So 5% of a\n\u003e trillion is $50 billion. Still, over just two years, that's enough to pay\n\u003e for an attack of at least that size ($75 billion).\n\u003e\n\u003e The budget for the government of China is about $3.6 trillion, the second\n\u003e largest in the world. And since they're an authoritarian country, they can\n\u003e basically do whatever they want with that money. It still seems unlikely\n\u003e they would spend more than 5% of that budget on doing something like\n\u003e attacking bitcoin. However, consider that China's M2 money supply has been\n\u003e increasing at a rate of almost $3 trillion per year. Protecting the ability\n\u003e to do this is seems like something worth spending some (printed) money on.\n\u003e So perhaps at some point, spending 10 or 20% of their budget for a year or\n\u003e two to attack bitcoin might seem like a good idea to some mickey mouse in\n\u003e the government. That would be $720 billion/year.\n\u003e\n\u003e So given the amount of seigniorage taken in every year by these central\n\u003e banks, it would seem to justify large expenditures. I'm not sure how\n\u003e realistic it would be, politically speaking, to gather $720 billion in a\n\u003e single year to attack bitcoin. It seems far fetched, even if the\n\u003e seigniorage they're protecting seems to justify it.\n\u003e\n\u003e So is this the level of attack we want to be resilient to? Nearly a $1\n\u003e trillion attack? I don't know. But we should figure that out as a\n\u003e community. And keep in mind, the level of attack we need to defend against\n\u003e depends on the size of bitcoin. The more valuable bitcoins are, the more\n\u003e damaging, more lucrative, and more valuable an attack would be for\n\u003e attackers. Its seems reasonable to assume that this is a linear\n\u003e relationship - that if bitcoins are worth twice as much, we need twice as\n\u003e much security (ie we want to make attacking bitcoin twice as costly).\n\u003e\n\u003e The next step is figuring out a reasonable lower bound for how much it\n\u003e takes to attack bitcoin. There are many attacks that can be done on\n\u003e bitcoin, but the one relevant to the discussion here is a 51% attack.\n\u003e Bitcoin's PoW basically is attackable buy buying about 25% of the existing\n\u003e mining power (for reasons like the selfish economic attack\n\u003e \u003chttps://github.com/fresheneesz/quantificationOfConsensusProtocolSecurity#the-selfish-economic-attack\u003e and\n\u003e the economic mining monopoly attack\n\u003e \u003chttps://github.com/fresheneesz/quantificationOfConsensusProtocolSecurity#economic-mining-monopoly-attack\u003e),\n\u003e which is about 40 exahashes/second.\n\u003e\n\u003e If you bought 400,000 WhatsMiner M30S+ rigs\n\u003e \u003chttps://www.buybitcoinworldwide.com/mining/hardware/\u003e at current market\n\u003e price, you'd need $1 billion to buy them all (which doesn't include the\n\u003e cost of setting up all that equipment, powering it, building the network\n\u003e infrastructure for it, etc etc). Let's say all that infra doubles the price\n\u003e to $2 billion. Even then, you couldn't simply buy half a million mining\n\u003e rigs from the market. That many just aren't available. An attacker would\n\u003e have to spend year and years building up their mining operation before they\n\u003e could actually perform the attack. They'd basically have to mine at a\n\u003e slight (probably insignificant) loss for that time. Their demand would push\n\u003e up the price of these mining rigs for at least a year or two until supply\n\u003e comes up to meet it. So lets say this doubles the price of the mining rigs\n\u003e (it could very well do significantly more than that). That makes for $3\n\u003e billion to build up this malicious mining operation. China could seize a\n\u003e mining pool, but likely couldn't do it quietly. They'd have to seize the\n\u003e pool and immediately use it to attack before miners stop using the pool\n\u003e (which might take a week or two). Maybe this would save them half the cost?\n\u003e\n\u003e So, lower bound on cost of attack is $1.5 billion. Upper bound on US govt\n\u003e attack is $72 billion. Upper bound on China govt attack is $720 billion. So\n\u003e based on this back-of-the-napkin line of thinking, its not super clear that\n\u003e reducing bitcoin's security is \"enough\" yet. There is also the question of:\n\u003e does a $1 trillion currency need to be secure against a $720 billion\n\u003e attack? Probably not. But should it be secure against a $10 billion attack?\n\u003e Maybe.\n\u003e\n\u003e However, the security will go up with price. If bitcoin goes up by 10x, as\n\u003e it is wont to do, that's nearly 10x the security (nearly, since coinbase\n\u003e rewards 10x, but the real value of fees almost certainly wouldn't go up as\n\u003e much). So that brings us to $15 billion of security. Still not clear\n\u003e without doing some more accurate analysis to determine more confidence in\n\u003e tighter bounds on cost of attack and likely attack budgets.\n\u003e\n\u003e But it certainly seems likely that my attack cost bounds are an order of\n\u003e magnitude too low, and its equally possible my estimates of potential\n\u003e available attack budgets are an order of magnitude too high. It doesn't\n\u003e seem quite as likely the reverse is true (that my bounds aren't good\n\u003e bounds).\n\u003e\n\u003e It seems possible that we currently have enough security, but seems\n\u003e likelier that we don't. It just isn't clear to me. Maybe someone has done\n\u003e some more accurate analysis that could help here.\n\u003e\n\u003e But before we talk about whether we should reduce our security to save\n\u003e costs, we need to determine how much security we need and how much security\n\u003e we have. Without good estimates with confident bounds, we simply can't make\n\u003e an informed decision to reduce security.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e I don't think 99% of transactions need that level of security\n\u003e\n\u003e Well you can't get security for the 1% of transactions that need it\n\u003e without giving that security to all transactions on the chain. Also, the\n\u003e blockchain security created by miners isn't really a per transaction thing\n\u003e anyway. An attack would affect all bitcoins regardless of what transactions\n\u003e they do or do not take part in.\n\u003e\n\u003e On Sun, May 23, 2021 at 9:52 AM Karl via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e The turn-around time for that takes a population of both users and\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e miners to cause. Increasing popularity of bitcoin has a far bigger\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e impact here, and it is already raising fees and energy use at an\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e established rate.\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e If it becomes an issue, as bandwidth increases block size could be\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e raised to lower fees.\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Which increases block rewards somewhat (at least to some level that\n\u003e\u003e matches\n\u003e\u003e \u003e the overall security of the network) and you still have the same amount\n\u003e\u003e of\n\u003e\u003e \u003e energy consumed.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e If you mean to implicitly propose that even if halved all the way with\n\u003e\u003e very large blocks, block rewards would just increase to the same\n\u003e\u003e level, meaning that any attempt to decrease them has no effect, I\n\u003e\u003e disagree. I expect that if you raise the block size, eventually\n\u003e\u003e there is so much supply for transactions that there are no fees at all\n\u003e\u003e (nor security). The numbers are all things the devs, miners, and\n\u003e\u003e users can together control.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e How to prove this is not happening?\n\u003e\u003e \u003e The best you can do is to have some number of authorities sign off on\n\u003e\u003e \u003e whether or not they are doing this.\n\u003e\u003e \u003e The problem is that authorities are bribeable.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e You could make the proof of work be a proof of environmental kindness\n\u003e\u003e by coding incentives for people to place and verify proof on the\n\u003e\u003e chain, and then rewarding people for acting on it as desired. You\n\u003e\u003e could code the chain to pay people to investigate and prove miners'\n\u003e\u003e business practices, for example. You could define the main chain as\n\u003e\u003e one where everyone consents the proofs are valid. There are a lot of\n\u003e\u003e issues to resolve and it would be a very different chain.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e There is not a single solution here. There are innumerable possible\n\u003e\u003e solutions, any one of which could be made to work with enough brains\n\u003e\u003e working on it. To use one, we need to agree on what kinds of\n\u003e\u003e solutions are acceptable.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e \u003e Alternately, other entities in the locality can use force to require the\n\u003e\u003e \u003e polluting entity to clean up or suffer significant consequences.\n\u003e\u003e \u003e This at least is better incentive-wise, as they others in the same\n\u003e\u003e locality\n\u003e\u003e \u003e are the ones most affected, but the ability to enforce may be difficult\n\u003e\u003e due\n\u003e\u003e \u003e to various political constructions; the miners could be in such deep\n\u003e\u003e cahoots\n\u003e\u003e \u003e with the local government that the local government would willingly hurt\n\u003e\u003e \u003e other local entities in the vicinity of the polluting entity.\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e As bitcoin grows, if people ask some locality to enforce behavior,\n\u003e\u003e they may need to be willing to enforce it themselves, too, or they\n\u003e\u003e might outcompete the locality.\n\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20210525/66077f2b/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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