Laser on Nostr: Provable physical possession of a public/private keypair, even when the private key ...

Provable physical possession of a public/private keypair, even when the private key is not granted to authorities, is sufficient for a judge to keep a person in jail for failing to cooperate with seizure of #Bitcoin, lawful or not.

Your setup *must* make it difficult or impossible to prove that you possess a public/private keypair to any #Bitcoin.

It's not enough to just make private keys hard to access. The entire setup needs to provide plausible deniability.

quoting
nevent1q…j5fn

This setup will avoid the problem of authorities being able to "prove" you have #Bitcoin in your possession.

1. A powered off #GrapheneOS device is completely E2EE encrypted at rest with nothing in memory. Plausible deniability: I forgot the password/PIN.

2. Green can be set not to remember previously accessed wallets, leaving no trace behind on the device. This allows you to grant access to the device if need being, and it will look pretty bare bones.

3. This leaves the Jade, which either has some state (if using PIN server) or none, if using #SeedQR. In both cases, ample plausibility exists in either "I forgot the pin", or "I've never set it up or truly used it".

This level of plausible deniability is critical as the State becomes more agressive with seizure.

This is one of the biggest reasons I've stopped having IRL friends and family use and maintain a dedicated laptop: too much risk of seizure if they don't know what they're doing.

#Bitcoin

nevent1q…zd93