📅 Original date posted:2014-06-17
📝 Original message:On 6/16/2014 8:09 AM, Daniel Rice wrote:
> What if we solved doublespends like this: If a node receives 2
> transactions that use the same input, they can put both of them into
> the new block as a proof of double spend, but the bitcoins are not
> sent to the outputs of either transactions. They are instead treated
> like a fee and given to the block solver node. This gives miners the
> needed incentive and tools to end doublespends instead of being forced
> to favor one transaction over the other.
Before considering a hard fork with unpredictable effects on the
uncertainty window, it would be interesting to look at a soft fork that
would directly target the goal of reducing the uncertainty window, like
treating locally-detected double-spends aged > T as invalid (see earlier
message "A statistical consensus rule for reducing 0-conf double-spend
risk").
If anything is worth a soft fork, wouldn't reducing the double-spend
uncertainty window by an order of magnitude be in the running?
Reducing the reasons that transactions don't get relayed, which actually
seems to have a shot of happening pretty soon, would also make this kind
of thing work better.
Tom Harding [ARCHIVE] /
npub1ms…pmwjy
2023-06-07 15:22:50
in reply to nevent1q…lggy
Author Public Key
npub1msef5qkfwz4t7qacwxz775wgdtlytph78g2g2z903x90874u263sypmwjyPublished at
2023-06-07 15:22:50Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-06-17\n📝 Original message:On 6/16/2014 8:09 AM, Daniel Rice wrote:\n\u003e What if we solved doublespends like this: If a node receives 2 \n\u003e transactions that use the same input, they can put both of them into \n\u003e the new block as a proof of double spend, but the bitcoins are not \n\u003e sent to the outputs of either transactions. They are instead treated \n\u003e like a fee and given to the block solver node. This gives miners the \n\u003e needed incentive and tools to end doublespends instead of being forced \n\u003e to favor one transaction over the other.\n\nBefore considering a hard fork with unpredictable effects on the \nuncertainty window, it would be interesting to look at a soft fork that \nwould directly target the goal of reducing the uncertainty window, like \ntreating locally-detected double-spends aged \u003e T as invalid (see earlier \nmessage \"A statistical consensus rule for reducing 0-conf double-spend \nrisk\").\n\nIf anything is worth a soft fork, wouldn't reducing the double-spend \nuncertainty window by an order of magnitude be in the running?\n\nReducing the reasons that transactions don't get relayed, which actually \nseems to have a shot of happening pretty soon, would also make this kind \nof thing work better.",
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