I don’t see how that thread debunks because it assumes a choice between one or the other. Why not both? Wouldn’t a rational actor attempt the cheaper private API transaction first? And if it didn’t complete in time, to then expand distribution, first to other private APIs and then later to public broadcast?
Also moonsettler’s analysis in the thread seems handwavy. “There is no guarantee that they would find a block in the timeframe you need it.”
Isn’t that use case dependent? What % of use cases are infeasible? And if the transaction is sent to the two biggest miners, now what % of use cases are infeasible?
Once a potential risk is identified, then proponents opine that the risk could be small. But how do they know?
I don’t know the magnitude of the risk either. How could I? To say conclusively, we would need a crystal ball to know all the ways the feature could be used or abused at any time in the future, even 100 years from now. If we get it wrong, we can’t just say “Oops!” and easily remove it.
Responses to your points:
➡️ People can trade financial contracts with DLCs.
I’m not concerned with P2P trading, with primary origination on-chain, or with secondary trading off-chain that happens independently of miners. I think the issue is secondary trading of options directly on chain.
➡️ What specific centralizing MEV is enabled by CTV?
Right now, I’m concerned about the potential for time-based and cost-based private transactions that could create centralizing MEV.
➡️ No AMM can be built with CTV / Sapio.
I think you would need to show that all AMMs must have a fundamental marketplace or contractual state that cannot be modeled by Sapio. It seems to me that if there is any possibility that there could be any secondary on-chain trading, then we can’t rule out the potential for time-based centralizing MEV through arbitrage, front-running, etc.
➡️ MEV already exists elsewhere.
Sure, but we don’t want to open the door to other abuses and make it worse. Protocol changes should do no harm.
➡️ It’s difficult to extract MEV currently.
This is a statement of what is happening today given current use cases and bitcoin’s current size and maturity. Opportunities for MEVil will change over time as new abuses develop and as bitcoin grows. Once the door is open, we can’t close it.
techfeudalist /
npub1nz…0yxqu
2024-09-13 14:59:54
in reply to nevent1q…xf3m
Author Public Key
npub1nz3cd3mx4jf9paxwrdgqvchaprjdge9pj9t58mkusw74q5saajkqu0yxquPublished at
2024-09-13 14:59:54Event JSON
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"content": "I don’t see how that thread debunks because it assumes a choice between one or the other. Why not both? Wouldn’t a rational actor attempt the cheaper private API transaction first? And if it didn’t complete in time, to then expand distribution, first to other private APIs and then later to public broadcast?\n\nAlso moonsettler’s analysis in the thread seems handwavy. “There is no guarantee that they would find a block in the timeframe you need it.” \n\nIsn’t that use case dependent? What % of use cases are infeasible? And if the transaction is sent to the two biggest miners, now what % of use cases are infeasible?\n\nOnce a potential risk is identified, then proponents opine that the risk could be small. But how do they know?\n\nI don’t know the magnitude of the risk either. How could I? To say conclusively, we would need a crystal ball to know all the ways the feature could be used or abused at any time in the future, even 100 years from now. If we get it wrong, we can’t just say “Oops!” and easily remove it. \n\nResponses to your points:\n\n➡️ People can trade financial contracts with DLCs. \n\nI’m not concerned with P2P trading, with primary origination on-chain, or with secondary trading off-chain that happens independently of miners. I think the issue is secondary trading of options directly on chain.\n\n➡️ What specific centralizing MEV is enabled by CTV? \n\nRight now, I’m concerned about the potential for time-based and cost-based private transactions that could create centralizing MEV. \n\n➡️ No AMM can be built with CTV / Sapio. \n\nI think you would need to show that all AMMs must have a fundamental marketplace or contractual state that cannot be modeled by Sapio. It seems to me that if there is any possibility that there could be any secondary on-chain trading, then we can’t rule out the potential for time-based centralizing MEV through arbitrage, front-running, etc. \n\n➡️ MEV already exists elsewhere. \n\nSure, but we don’t want to open the door to other abuses and make it worse. Protocol changes should do no harm. \n\n➡️ It’s difficult to extract MEV currently. \n\nThis is a statement of what is happening today given current use cases and bitcoin’s current size and maturity. Opportunities for MEVil will change over time as new abuses develop and as bitcoin grows. Once the door is open, we can’t close it.",
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