📅 Original date posted:2018-05-24
📝 Original message:Den tor 24 maj 2018 04:08Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> skrev:
>
> My understanding of the question is this:
>
> Are there any useful applications which would be impeded if a signing
> party who could authorize an arbitrary transaction spending a coin had
> the option to instead sign a delegation to a new script?
>
> The reason this question is interesting to ask is because the obvious
> answer is "no": since the signer(s) could have signed an arbitrary
> transaction instead, being able to delegate is strictly less powerful.
> Moreover, absent graftroot they could always "delegate" non-atomically
> by spending the coin with the output being the delegated script that
> they would have graftrooted instead.
>
> Sometimes obvious answers have non-obvious counter examples, e.g.
> Andrews points related to blindsigning are worth keeping in mind.
>
As stated above by Wuille this seems to not be a concern for typical P2SH
uses, but my argument here is simply that in many cases, not all
stakeholders in a transaction will hold one of the private keys required to
sign. And such stakeholders would want a guarantee that the original script
is followed as promised.
I agree that such flags typically wouldn't have a meaningful effect for
funds from non-P2SH addresses, since the entire transaction / script could
be replaced by the very same keyholders.
I'm not concerned by the ability to move funds to an address with the new
rules that you'd otherwise graftroot in, only that you can provide a
transparent guarantee that you ALSO follow the original script as promised.
What happens *after* you have followed the original script is unrelated,
IMHO.
>
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Natanael [ARCHIVE] /
npub179…lpmjt
2023-06-07 18:12:26
in reply to nevent1q…ltk0
Author Public Key
npub1798ncudyucap9jzzujjsgufx8tdykm8auzfledjcs6f6wf4ekqvq8lpmjtPublished at
2023-06-07 18:12:26Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2018-05-24\n📝 Original message:Den tor 24 maj 2018 04:08Gregory Maxwell via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e skrev:\n\n\u003e\n\u003e My understanding of the question is this:\n\u003e\n\u003e Are there any useful applications which would be impeded if a signing\n\u003e party who could authorize an arbitrary transaction spending a coin had\n\u003e the option to instead sign a delegation to a new script?\n\u003e\n\u003e The reason this question is interesting to ask is because the obvious\n\u003e answer is \"no\": since the signer(s) could have signed an arbitrary\n\u003e transaction instead, being able to delegate is strictly less powerful.\n\u003e Moreover, absent graftroot they could always \"delegate\" non-atomically\n\u003e by spending the coin with the output being the delegated script that\n\u003e they would have graftrooted instead.\n\u003e\n\u003e Sometimes obvious answers have non-obvious counter examples, e.g.\n\u003e Andrews points related to blindsigning are worth keeping in mind.\n\u003e\n\nAs stated above by Wuille this seems to not be a concern for typical P2SH\nuses, but my argument here is simply that in many cases, not all\nstakeholders in a transaction will hold one of the private keys required to\nsign. And such stakeholders would want a guarantee that the original script\nis followed as promised.\n\nI agree that such flags typically wouldn't have a meaningful effect for\nfunds from non-P2SH addresses, since the entire transaction / script could\nbe replaced by the very same keyholders.\n\nI'm not concerned by the ability to move funds to an address with the new\nrules that you'd otherwise graftroot in, only that you can provide a\ntransparent guarantee that you ALSO follow the original script as promised.\nWhat happens *after* you have followed the original script is unrelated,\nIMHO.\n\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20180524/1eccb847/attachment-0001.html\u003e",
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