📅 Original date posted:2016-02-09
📝 Original message:
Anthony Towns <aj at erisian.com.au> writes:
> On Tue, Feb 09, 2016 at 10:09:12AM +1030, Rusty Russell wrote:
>> Otherwise, if you want to do a unilateral close, there's some game
>> theory as you'd rather convince the other side to do it so your own
>> funds aren't locked up.
>
> I think the options are:
>
> a) keep the channel open
> b) they close the channel unilaterally
> c) you close the channel unilaterally
> d) you both close the channel cooperatively
>
> At any point, I believe the preferences are strictly: d > b > c
>
> (b) is better than (c) because of the OP_CSV delay; and (d) is better
> than (b) if you can use a lower transaction fee than you use for your
> commitment transactions, or spend directly to a useful output address
> (opening up a new channel eg).
>
> If you find yourself trying to convince the other person to do (b)
> to avoid doing (c) yourself, I think it's a dominating strategy to
> simply do (d) -- you prefer that over (b) anyway, and they will prefer
> it over (c).
>
> With the current arrangement, I don't think your counterparty can
> realistically make any threats: "you'll close the channel? okay,
> that's better than me closing it!" and "you'll close the channel
> unilaterally? well, that's a lot worse for you as it is for me,
> so whatever".
>
> With an OP_CSV on both sides of HTLCs, you can make a somewhat
> realistic threat: "if you don't pay me $x to do a cooperative close,
> I'll close unilaterally which will lock your funds up. sure you can
> close unilaterally yourself, but your funds will still be locked up that
> way too."
>
> So changing seems like it would make things marginally worse, but no
> better, to me.
Fair point. The issue will improve when we have close with outstanding
HTLCs. Meanwhile it disturbs me that the party which goes offline pays
the least penalty; their counterparties have their funds tied though.
Cheers,
Rusty.
Rusty Russell [ARCHIVE] /
npub1zw…hkhpx
2023-06-09 12:45:43
in reply to nevent1q…dlhf
Author Public Key
npub1zw7cc8z78v6s3grujfvcv3ckpvg6kr0w7nz9yzvwyglyg0qu5sjsqhkhpxPublished at
2023-06-09 12:45:43Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2016-02-09\n📝 Original message:\nAnthony Towns \u003caj at erisian.com.au\u003e writes:\n\u003e On Tue, Feb 09, 2016 at 10:09:12AM +1030, Rusty Russell wrote:\n\u003e\u003e Otherwise, if you want to do a unilateral close, there's some game\n\u003e\u003e theory as you'd rather convince the other side to do it so your own\n\u003e\u003e funds aren't locked up.\n\u003e\n\u003e I think the options are:\n\u003e\n\u003e a) keep the channel open\n\u003e b) they close the channel unilaterally\n\u003e c) you close the channel unilaterally\n\u003e d) you both close the channel cooperatively\n\u003e\n\u003e At any point, I believe the preferences are strictly: d \u003e b \u003e c\n\u003e\n\u003e (b) is better than (c) because of the OP_CSV delay; and (d) is better\n\u003e than (b) if you can use a lower transaction fee than you use for your\n\u003e commitment transactions, or spend directly to a useful output address\n\u003e (opening up a new channel eg).\n\u003e\n\u003e If you find yourself trying to convince the other person to do (b)\n\u003e to avoid doing (c) yourself, I think it's a dominating strategy to\n\u003e simply do (d) -- you prefer that over (b) anyway, and they will prefer\n\u003e it over (c).\n\u003e\n\u003e With the current arrangement, I don't think your counterparty can\n\u003e realistically make any threats: \"you'll close the channel? okay,\n\u003e that's better than me closing it!\" and \"you'll close the channel\n\u003e unilaterally? well, that's a lot worse for you as it is for me,\n\u003e so whatever\".\n\u003e\n\u003e With an OP_CSV on both sides of HTLCs, you can make a somewhat\n\u003e realistic threat: \"if you don't pay me $x to do a cooperative close,\n\u003e I'll close unilaterally which will lock your funds up. sure you can\n\u003e close unilaterally yourself, but your funds will still be locked up that\n\u003e way too.\"\n\u003e\n\u003e So changing seems like it would make things marginally worse, but no\n\u003e better, to me.\n\nFair point. The issue will improve when we have close with outstanding\nHTLCs. Meanwhile it disturbs me that the party which goes offline pays\nthe least penalty; their counterparties have their funds tied though.\n\nCheers,\nRusty.",
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