ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: π
Original date posted:2020-06-29 π Original message:Good morning Dave, et al., ...
π
Original date posted:2020-06-29
π Original message:Good morning Dave, et al.,
> > Myopic Miners: This bribery attack relies on all miners
> >
> >
> > being rational, hence considering their utility at game conclu-
> > sion instead of myopically optimizing for the next block. If
> > a portion of the miners are myopic and any of them gets to
> > create a block during the first T β 1 rounds, that miner would
> > include Aliceβs transaction and Bobβs bribery attempt would
> > have failed.
> > In such scenarios the attack succeeds only with a certain
> > probability β only if a myopic miner does not create a block
> > in the first T β 1 rounds. The success probability therefore
> > decreases exponentially in T . Hence, to incentivize miners
> > to support the attack, Bob has to increase his offered bribe
> > exponentially in T .
>
> This is a good abstract description, but I think it might be useful for
> readers of this list who are wondering about the impact of this attack
> to put it in concrete terms. I'm bad at statistics, but I think the
> probability of bribery failing (even if Bob offers a bribe with an
> appropriately high feerate) is 1-exp(-b*h) where `b` is the number of
> blocks until timeout and `h` is a percentage of the hashrate controlled
> by so-called myopic miners. Given that, here's a table of attack
> failure probabilities:
>
> "Myopic" hashrate
> B 1% 10% 33% 50%
> l +---------------------------------
> o 6 | 5.82% 45.12% 86.19% 95.02%
> c 36 | 30.23% 97.27% 100.00% 100.00%
> k 144 | 76.31% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
> s 288 | 94.39% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
>
> So, if I understand correctly, even a small amount of "myopic" hashrate
> and long timeouts---or modest amounts of hashrate and short
> timeouts---makes this attack unlikely to succeed (and, even in the cases
> where it does succeed, Bob will have to offer a very large bribe to
> compensate "rational" miners for their high chance of losing out on
> gaining any transaction fees).
>
> Additionally, I think there's the problem of measuring the distribution
> of "myopic" hashrate versus "rational" hashrate. "Rational" miners need
> to do this in order to ensure they only accept Bob's timelocked bribe if
> it pays a sufficiently high fee. However, different miners who try to
> track what bribes were relayed versus what transactions got mined may
> come to different conclusions about the relative hashrate of "myopic"
> miners, leading some of them to require higher bribes, which may lead
> those those who estimated a lower relative hash rate to assume the rate
> of "myopic" mining in increasing, producing a feedback loop that makes
> other miners think the rate of "myopic" miners is increasing. (And that
> assumes none of the miners is deliberately juking the stats to mislead
> its competitors into leaving money on the table.)
A thought occurs to me, that we should not be so hasty to call non-myopic strategy "rational".
Let us consider instead "myopic" and "non-myopic" strategies in a population of miners.
I contend that in a mixed population of "myopic" and "non-myopic" miners, the myopic strategy is dominant in the game-theoretic sense, i.e. it might earn less if all miners were myopic, but if most miners were non-myopic and a small sub-population were myopic and there was no easy way for non-myopic miners to punish myopic miners, then the myopic miners will end up earning more (at the expense of the non-myopic miners) and dominate over non-myopic miners.
Such dominant result should prevent non-myopic miners from arising in the first place.
The dominance results from the fact that by accepting the Alice transaction, myopic miners are effectively deducting the fees earned by non-myopic miners by preventing the Bob transaction from being confirmable.
On the other hand, even if the non-myopic miners successfully defer the Alice transaction, the myopic miner still has a chance equal to its hashrate of getting the Bob transaction and its attached fee.
Thus, myopic miners impose costs on their non-myopic competitors that non-myopic miners cannot impose their myopic competitors.
If even one myopic miner successfully gets the Alice transaction confirmed, all the non-myopic miners lose out on the Bob bribe fee.
So I think the myopic strategy will be dominant and non-myopic miners will not arise in the first place.
Regards,
ZmnSCPxj
Published at
2023-06-07 18:25:41Event JSON
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Original date posted:2020-06-29\nπ Original message:Good morning Dave, et al.,\n\n\n\u003e \u003e Myopic Miners: This bribery attack relies on all miners\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e being rational, hence considering their utility at game conclu-\n\u003e \u003e sion instead of myopically optimizing for the next block. If\n\u003e \u003e a portion of the miners are myopic and any of them gets to\n\u003e \u003e create a block during the first T β 1 rounds, that miner would\n\u003e \u003e include Aliceβs transaction and Bobβs bribery attempt would\n\u003e \u003e have failed.\n\u003e \u003e In such scenarios the attack succeeds only with a certain\n\u003e \u003e probability β only if a myopic miner does not create a block\n\u003e \u003e in the first T β 1 rounds. The success probability therefore\n\u003e \u003e decreases exponentially in T . Hence, to incentivize miners\n\u003e \u003e to support the attack, Bob has to increase his offered bribe\n\u003e \u003e exponentially in T .\n\u003e\n\u003e This is a good abstract description, but I think it might be useful for\n\u003e readers of this list who are wondering about the impact of this attack\n\u003e to put it in concrete terms. I'm bad at statistics, but I think the\n\u003e probability of bribery failing (even if Bob offers a bribe with an\n\u003e appropriately high feerate) is 1-exp(-b*h) where `b` is the number of\n\u003e blocks until timeout and `h` is a percentage of the hashrate controlled\n\u003e by so-called myopic miners. Given that, here's a table of attack\n\u003e failure probabilities:\n\u003e\n\u003e \"Myopic\" hashrate\n\u003e B 1% 10% 33% 50%\n\u003e l +---------------------------------\n\u003e o 6 | 5.82% 45.12% 86.19% 95.02%\n\u003e c 36 | 30.23% 97.27% 100.00% 100.00%\n\u003e k 144 | 76.31% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%\n\u003e s 288 | 94.39% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%\n\u003e\n\u003e So, if I understand correctly, even a small amount of \"myopic\" hashrate\n\u003e and long timeouts---or modest amounts of hashrate and short\n\u003e timeouts---makes this attack unlikely to succeed (and, even in the cases\n\u003e where it does succeed, Bob will have to offer a very large bribe to\n\u003e compensate \"rational\" miners for their high chance of losing out on\n\u003e gaining any transaction fees).\n\u003e\n\u003e Additionally, I think there's the problem of measuring the distribution\n\u003e of \"myopic\" hashrate versus \"rational\" hashrate. \"Rational\" miners need\n\u003e to do this in order to ensure they only accept Bob's timelocked bribe if\n\u003e it pays a sufficiently high fee. However, different miners who try to\n\u003e track what bribes were relayed versus what transactions got mined may\n\u003e come to different conclusions about the relative hashrate of \"myopic\"\n\u003e miners, leading some of them to require higher bribes, which may lead\n\u003e those those who estimated a lower relative hash rate to assume the rate\n\u003e of \"myopic\" mining in increasing, producing a feedback loop that makes\n\u003e other miners think the rate of \"myopic\" miners is increasing. (And that\n\u003e assumes none of the miners is deliberately juking the stats to mislead\n\u003e its competitors into leaving money on the table.)\n\nA thought occurs to me, that we should not be so hasty to call non-myopic strategy \"rational\".\nLet us consider instead \"myopic\" and \"non-myopic\" strategies in a population of miners.\n\nI contend that in a mixed population of \"myopic\" and \"non-myopic\" miners, the myopic strategy is dominant in the game-theoretic sense, i.e. it might earn less if all miners were myopic, but if most miners were non-myopic and a small sub-population were myopic and there was no easy way for non-myopic miners to punish myopic miners, then the myopic miners will end up earning more (at the expense of the non-myopic miners) and dominate over non-myopic miners.\nSuch dominant result should prevent non-myopic miners from arising in the first place.\n\nThe dominance results from the fact that by accepting the Alice transaction, myopic miners are effectively deducting the fees earned by non-myopic miners by preventing the Bob transaction from being confirmable.\nOn the other hand, even if the non-myopic miners successfully defer the Alice transaction, the myopic miner still has a chance equal to its hashrate of getting the Bob transaction and its attached fee.\nThus, myopic miners impose costs on their non-myopic competitors that non-myopic miners cannot impose their myopic competitors.\nIf even one myopic miner successfully gets the Alice transaction confirmed, all the non-myopic miners lose out on the Bob bribe fee.\n\nSo I think the myopic strategy will be dominant and non-myopic miners will not arise in the first place.\n\n\nRegards,\nZmnSCPxj",
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