📅 Original date posted:2022-04-26
📝 Original message:You may be interested in these posts on transaction signalling:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014193.html
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014202.html
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.html
On Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 3:12 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> Alongside the debate with CTV right now there's a second debate that was
> not fully hashed out in the activation of Taproot. There is a lot of
> argument around what Speedy Trial is or isn't, what BIP8 T/F is or isn't
> etc. A significant reason for the breakdown in civility around this debate
> is that because we don't have a means of measuring user support for
> proposed sof-fork changes, it invariably devolves into people claiming that
> their circles support/reject a proposal, AND that their circles are more
> broadly representative of the set of Bitcoin users as a whole.
>
> It seems everyone in this forum has at one point or another said "I would
> support activation of ____ if there was consensus on it, but there isn't".
> This statement, in order to be true, requires that there exist a set of
> conditions that would convince you that there is consensus. People have
> tried to dodge this question by saying "it's obvious", but the reality is
> that it fundamentally isn't. My bubble has a different "obvious" answer
> than any of yours.
>
> Secondly, due to the trauma of the block size wars, no one wants to utter
> a statement that could imply that miners have any influence over what
> rulesets get activated or don't. As such "miner signaling" is consistently
> devalued as a signal for market demand. I don't think this is reasonable
> since following the events of '17 miners are aware that they have the
> strong incentive that they understand market demand. Nevertheless, as it
> stands right now the only signal we have to work with is miner signaling,
> which I think is rightly frustrating to a lot of people.
>
> So how can we measure User Support for a proposed rule change?
>
> I've had this idea floating around in the back of my head for a while, and
> I'd like to solicit some feedback here. Currently, all forms of activation
> that are under consideration involve miner signaling in one form or
> another. What if we could make it such that users could more directly
> pressure miners to act on their behalf? After all, if miners are but the
> humble servants of user demands, this should be in alignment with how
> people want Bitcoin to behave.
>
> Currently, the only means users have of influencing miner decisions are A.
> rejection of blocks that don't follow rules and B. paying fees for
> transaction inclusion. I suggest we combine these in such a way that
> transactions themselves can signal for upgrade. I believe (though am not
> certain) that there are "free" bits in the version field of a transaction
> that are presently ignored. If we could devise a mapping between some of
> those free bits, and the signaling bits in the block header, it would be
> possible to have rules as follows:
>
> - A transaction signaling in the affirmative MUST NOT be included in a
> block that does not signal in the affirmative
> - A transaction that is NOT signaling MAY be included in a block
> regardless of that block's signaling vector
> - (Optional) A transaction signaling in the negative MUST NOT be included
> in a block that signals in the affirmative
>
> Under this set of conditions, a user has the means of sybil-resistant
> influence over miner decisions. If a miner cannot collect the fees for a
> transaction without signaling, the user's fee becomes active economic
> pressure for the miner to signal (or not, if we include some variant of the
> negative clause). In this environment, miners could have a better view into
> what users do want, as would the Bitcoin network at large.
>
> Some may take issue with the idea that people can pay for the outcome they
> want and may try to compare a method like this to Proof of Stake, but there
> are only 3 sybil resistant mechanisms I am aware of, and any "real" view
> into what social consensus looks like MUST be sybil resistant:
>
> - Hashpower
> - Proof of personhood (KYC)
> - Capital burn/risk
>
> Letting hashpower decide this is the thing that is currently contentious,
> KYC is dead on arrival both on technical and social grounds, which really
> just leaves some means of getting capital into the process of consensus
> measurement. This mechanism I'm proposing is measurable completely
> en-protocol and doesn't require trust in institutions that fork futures
> would. Additionally it could be an auxiliary feature of the soft fork
> deployment scheme chosen making it something you could neatly package all
> together with the deployment itself.
>
> There are many potential tweaks to the design I propose above:
> 1. Do we include a notion of negative signaling (allowing for the
> possibility of rejection)
> 2. Do we make it such that miner signaling must be congruent with >X% of
> transactions, where congruence is that the signal must match any
> non-neutral signal of transaction.
>
> Some anticipated objections:
>
> 1. signaling isn't voting, no deployment should be made without consensus
> first.
> - yeah well we can't currently measure consensus right now, so that's not
> a super helpful thing to say and is breeding ground for abuse in the form
> of certain people making the unsubstantiated claim that consensus does or
> does not exist for a particular initiative
>
> 2. This is just a proposal for "pay to play", we should not let the
> wealthy make consensus decisions.
> - I agree that wealth should not be able to strong-arm decision making.
> But the status quo seems even worse where we let publicly influential
> people decide consensus in such a way where not only do they not "lose
> ammunition" in the process of campaigning, but actually accrue it, creating
> really bad long-term balances of power.
>
> 3. Enforcing this proposal requires its own soft fork.
> - Yes. It does...and there's a certain cosmic irony to that, but before we
> consider how to make this happen, I'd like to even discuss whether or not
> it's a good idea.
>
> 4. This gives CoinJoin pool operators and L2 protocol implementations
> power over deciding consensus.
> - I see this as an improvement over the status quo
>
> 5. This encourages "spam"
> - If you pay the fees, it's not spam.
>
> The biggest question I'd like to pose to the forum is:
> - Does a scheme like this afford us a better view into consensus than we
> have today?
> - Can it be gamed to give us a *worse* view into consensus? How?
> - Does it measure the right thing? If not, what do you think is the right
> thing to measure? (assuming we could)
> - Should I write a BIP spec'ing this out in detail?
>
> Cheers,
> Keagan
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
--
- Bryan
https://twitter.com/kanzure
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Bryan Bishop [ARCHIVE] /
npub1vt…jsjpg
2023-06-07 23:08:21
in reply to nevent1q…mmq0
Author Public Key
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2023-06-07 23:08:21Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2022-04-26\n📝 Original message:You may be interested in these posts on transaction signalling:\nhttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014193.html\nhttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-April/014202.html\nhttps://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2017-May/014251.html\n\n\nOn Tue, Apr 26, 2022 at 3:12 PM Keagan McClelland via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e Hi all,\n\u003e\n\u003e Alongside the debate with CTV right now there's a second debate that was\n\u003e not fully hashed out in the activation of Taproot. There is a lot of\n\u003e argument around what Speedy Trial is or isn't, what BIP8 T/F is or isn't\n\u003e etc. A significant reason for the breakdown in civility around this debate\n\u003e is that because we don't have a means of measuring user support for\n\u003e proposed sof-fork changes, it invariably devolves into people claiming that\n\u003e their circles support/reject a proposal, AND that their circles are more\n\u003e broadly representative of the set of Bitcoin users as a whole.\n\u003e\n\u003e It seems everyone in this forum has at one point or another said \"I would\n\u003e support activation of ____ if there was consensus on it, but there isn't\".\n\u003e This statement, in order to be true, requires that there exist a set of\n\u003e conditions that would convince you that there is consensus. People have\n\u003e tried to dodge this question by saying \"it's obvious\", but the reality is\n\u003e that it fundamentally isn't. My bubble has a different \"obvious\" answer\n\u003e than any of yours.\n\u003e\n\u003e Secondly, due to the trauma of the block size wars, no one wants to utter\n\u003e a statement that could imply that miners have any influence over what\n\u003e rulesets get activated or don't. As such \"miner signaling\" is consistently\n\u003e devalued as a signal for market demand. I don't think this is reasonable\n\u003e since following the events of '17 miners are aware that they have the\n\u003e strong incentive that they understand market demand. Nevertheless, as it\n\u003e stands right now the only signal we have to work with is miner signaling,\n\u003e which I think is rightly frustrating to a lot of people.\n\u003e\n\u003e So how can we measure User Support for a proposed rule change?\n\u003e\n\u003e I've had this idea floating around in the back of my head for a while, and\n\u003e I'd like to solicit some feedback here. Currently, all forms of activation\n\u003e that are under consideration involve miner signaling in one form or\n\u003e another. What if we could make it such that users could more directly\n\u003e pressure miners to act on their behalf? After all, if miners are but the\n\u003e humble servants of user demands, this should be in alignment with how\n\u003e people want Bitcoin to behave.\n\u003e\n\u003e Currently, the only means users have of influencing miner decisions are A.\n\u003e rejection of blocks that don't follow rules and B. paying fees for\n\u003e transaction inclusion. I suggest we combine these in such a way that\n\u003e transactions themselves can signal for upgrade. I believe (though am not\n\u003e certain) that there are \"free\" bits in the version field of a transaction\n\u003e that are presently ignored. If we could devise a mapping between some of\n\u003e those free bits, and the signaling bits in the block header, it would be\n\u003e possible to have rules as follows:\n\u003e\n\u003e - A transaction signaling in the affirmative MUST NOT be included in a\n\u003e block that does not signal in the affirmative\n\u003e - A transaction that is NOT signaling MAY be included in a block\n\u003e regardless of that block's signaling vector\n\u003e - (Optional) A transaction signaling in the negative MUST NOT be included\n\u003e in a block that signals in the affirmative\n\u003e\n\u003e Under this set of conditions, a user has the means of sybil-resistant\n\u003e influence over miner decisions. If a miner cannot collect the fees for a\n\u003e transaction without signaling, the user's fee becomes active economic\n\u003e pressure for the miner to signal (or not, if we include some variant of the\n\u003e negative clause). In this environment, miners could have a better view into\n\u003e what users do want, as would the Bitcoin network at large.\n\u003e\n\u003e Some may take issue with the idea that people can pay for the outcome they\n\u003e want and may try to compare a method like this to Proof of Stake, but there\n\u003e are only 3 sybil resistant mechanisms I am aware of, and any \"real\" view\n\u003e into what social consensus looks like MUST be sybil resistant:\n\u003e\n\u003e - Hashpower\n\u003e - Proof of personhood (KYC)\n\u003e - Capital burn/risk\n\u003e\n\u003e Letting hashpower decide this is the thing that is currently contentious,\n\u003e KYC is dead on arrival both on technical and social grounds, which really\n\u003e just leaves some means of getting capital into the process of consensus\n\u003e measurement. This mechanism I'm proposing is measurable completely\n\u003e en-protocol and doesn't require trust in institutions that fork futures\n\u003e would. Additionally it could be an auxiliary feature of the soft fork\n\u003e deployment scheme chosen making it something you could neatly package all\n\u003e together with the deployment itself.\n\u003e\n\u003e There are many potential tweaks to the design I propose above:\n\u003e 1. Do we include a notion of negative signaling (allowing for the\n\u003e possibility of rejection)\n\u003e 2. Do we make it such that miner signaling must be congruent with \u003eX% of\n\u003e transactions, where congruence is that the signal must match any\n\u003e non-neutral signal of transaction.\n\u003e\n\u003e Some anticipated objections:\n\u003e\n\u003e 1. signaling isn't voting, no deployment should be made without consensus\n\u003e first.\n\u003e - yeah well we can't currently measure consensus right now, so that's not\n\u003e a super helpful thing to say and is breeding ground for abuse in the form\n\u003e of certain people making the unsubstantiated claim that consensus does or\n\u003e does not exist for a particular initiative\n\u003e\n\u003e 2. This is just a proposal for \"pay to play\", we should not let the\n\u003e wealthy make consensus decisions.\n\u003e - I agree that wealth should not be able to strong-arm decision making.\n\u003e But the status quo seems even worse where we let publicly influential\n\u003e people decide consensus in such a way where not only do they not \"lose\n\u003e ammunition\" in the process of campaigning, but actually accrue it, creating\n\u003e really bad long-term balances of power.\n\u003e\n\u003e 3. Enforcing this proposal requires its own soft fork.\n\u003e - Yes. It does...and there's a certain cosmic irony to that, but before we\n\u003e consider how to make this happen, I'd like to even discuss whether or not\n\u003e it's a good idea.\n\u003e\n\u003e 4. This gives CoinJoin pool operators and L2 protocol implementations\n\u003e power over deciding consensus.\n\u003e - I see this as an improvement over the status quo\n\u003e\n\u003e 5. This encourages \"spam\"\n\u003e - If you pay the fees, it's not spam.\n\u003e\n\u003e The biggest question I'd like to pose to the forum is:\n\u003e - Does a scheme like this afford us a better view into consensus than we\n\u003e have today?\n\u003e - Can it be gamed to give us a *worse* view into consensus? How?\n\u003e - Does it measure the right thing? If not, what do you think is the right\n\u003e thing to measure? (assuming we could)\n\u003e - Should I write a BIP spec'ing this out in detail?\n\u003e\n\u003e Cheers,\n\u003e Keagan\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n\n\n-- \n- Bryan\nhttps://twitter.com/kanzure\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20220426/64c2013e/attachment.html\u003e",
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