📅 Original date posted:2014-08-20
📝 Original message:Hi there,
quote:
[...]
> If two distinct transactions (with unrelated bitcoin addresses)
> come from the same set of 8 peers, the attacker can conclude that they
> originated from the same user. This gives another method (in addition
> to transaction graph analysis) for an attacker to link different BC
> addresses of the same user.
Using the same set of nodes for posting transactions using unrelated
inputs kind of limits the privacy improvement that can be gained from
using unrelated inputs in the first place.
Similar to how Tor uses different circuits for different hosts to
connect to, it may make more sense to only use the same set of nodes
for posting a subsequent transaction when the input addresses are also
the same.
[...]
> Some details are here: https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Bitcoin
>
I also find the topic of banning Tor exit nodes interesting.
I wonder if it makes more sense not to ban IP addresses completely,
but instead to throttle them using a PoW-based access control
scheme. Misbehaving addresses can have their connecting difficulty
scaled up, which should make it uneconomic to try to DoS the usage of
Tor exit nodes for connecting to Bitcoin.
It may also help nodes behind a NAT router if they share their global
IP with misconfigured nodes.
Best regards,
Isidor
Isidor Zeuner [ARCHIVE] /
npub1wz…2jvxz
2023-06-07 15:25:15
in reply to nevent1q…flw3
Author Public Key
npub1wz2sm8h4ylh9dn28688vjzwrmhaxnh3jl04p8jk3qeq7umwf8cus72jvxzPublished at
2023-06-07 15:25:15Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-08-20\n📝 Original message:Hi there,\n\nquote:\n[...]\n\u003e If two distinct transactions (with unrelated bitcoin addresses)\n\u003e come from the same set of 8 peers, the attacker can conclude that they\n\u003e originated from the same user. This gives another method (in addition\n\u003e to transaction graph analysis) for an attacker to link different BC\n\u003e addresses of the same user.\n\nUsing the same set of nodes for posting transactions using unrelated\ninputs kind of limits the privacy improvement that can be gained from\nusing unrelated inputs in the first place.\n\nSimilar to how Tor uses different circuits for different hosts to\nconnect to, it may make more sense to only use the same set of nodes\nfor posting a subsequent transaction when the input addresses are also\nthe same.\n\n[...]\n\u003e Some details are here: https://www.cryptolux.org/index.php/Bitcoin\n\u003e\n\nI also find the topic of banning Tor exit nodes interesting.\n\nI wonder if it makes more sense not to ban IP addresses completely,\nbut instead to throttle them using a PoW-based access control\nscheme. Misbehaving addresses can have their connecting difficulty\nscaled up, which should make it uneconomic to try to DoS the usage of\nTor exit nodes for connecting to Bitcoin.\n\nIt may also help nodes behind a NAT router if they share their global\nIP with misconfigured nodes.\n\nBest regards,\n\nIsidor",
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