📅 Original date posted:2022-07-10
📝 Original message:
> On Jul 10, 2022, at 07:17, alicexbt <alicexbt at protonmail.com> wrote:
> Hi ZmnSCPxj,
>
>
>> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without community consensus.
>> Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to deploy.
>
> `consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval` for mainnet in [chainparams.cpp][1] can be decreased to 195000. This will reduce the number of halvings from 34 to 14 and subsidy will be 0 when it becomes less than 0.01 although not sure if this will be a soft fork.
Soft fork, though a bit aggressive, as it would invalidate all existing blocks above the first new halving height block which claimed more than the reduced reward.
Increasing the value would be a hard fork, as it would validate blocks that would previously have been invalid, as opposed to a soft fork, which invalidates blocks that would previously have been valid.
e
> I doubt there will be consensus for it because all the [projections and predictability][2] about bitcoin(currency) would be affected by this change. Maybe everyone can agree with this change if most of the miners start being 'compliant' like one of the coinjoin implementation.
>
> [1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp#L66
> [2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply
>
>
> /dev/fd0
>
> Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
>
> ------- Original Message -------
> On Saturday, July 9th, 2022 at 9:59 PM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
>
>> Good morning e, and list,
>>
>>> Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to which I was responding.
>>> Math cannot prove how much coin is “lost”, and even if it was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I’ve already pointed out. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as it does not with any other good.
>>> The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship resistance, not on price.
>>
>>
>> To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance ("tail emission"):
>>
>> * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and one which had a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible or zero.
>> * Now consider a censoring miner.
>> * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. "censors") the miner loses out on the fees of those transactions.
>> * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from the censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost.
>> * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is small relative to the total earnings of each block.
>> * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is large relative to the total earnings of each block.
>> * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains from the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situation.
>>
>> Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy erodes the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved.
>> But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved are censored or not censored.
>> Thus, there is no incentive, considering only the block subsidy, to not censor coin movements.
>> Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements.
>>
>>
>> Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without community consensus.
>> Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to deploy.
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> ZmnSCPxj
>> _______________________________________________
>> bitcoin-dev mailing list
>> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
>> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
Eric Voskuil [ARCHIVE] /
npub1sg…ppx3c
2023-06-07 23:11:33
in reply to nevent1q…8xaj
Author Public Key
npub1sgs97fe0n9wehe6zw7drcxdz4cy9yt9pfqjv8gasz5jlk4zezc0quppx3cPublished at
2023-06-07 23:11:33Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2022-07-10\n📝 Original message:\n\u003e On Jul 10, 2022, at 07:17, alicexbt \u003calicexbt at protonmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e Hi ZmnSCPxj,\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without community consensus.\n\u003e\u003e Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to deploy.\n\u003e \n\u003e `consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval` for mainnet in [chainparams.cpp][1] can be decreased to 195000. This will reduce the number of halvings from 34 to 14 and subsidy will be 0 when it becomes less than 0.01 although not sure if this will be a soft fork.\n\nSoft fork, though a bit aggressive, as it would invalidate all existing blocks above the first new halving height block which claimed more than the reduced reward.\n\nIncreasing the value would be a hard fork, as it would validate blocks that would previously have been invalid, as opposed to a soft fork, which invalidates blocks that would previously have been valid.\n\ne\n\n\u003e I doubt there will be consensus for it because all the [projections and predictability][2] about bitcoin(currency) would be affected by this change. Maybe everyone can agree with this change if most of the miners start being 'compliant' like one of the coinjoin implementation.\n\u003e \n\u003e [1]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/chainparams.cpp#L66\n\u003e [2]: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Controlled_supply\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e /dev/fd0\n\u003e \n\u003e Sent with Proton Mail secure email.\n\u003e \n\u003e ------- Original Message -------\n\u003e On Saturday, July 9th, 2022 at 9:59 PM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev \u003cbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Good morning e, and list,\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e\u003e Yet you posted several links which made that specific correlation, to which I was responding.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e Math cannot prove how much coin is “lost”, and even if it was provable that the amount of coin lost converges to the amount produced, it is of no consequence - for the reasons I’ve already pointed out. The amount of market production has no impact on market price, just as it does not with any other good.\n\u003e\u003e\u003e The reason to object to perpetual issuance is the impact on censorship resistance, not on price.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e To clarify about censorship resistance and perpetual issuance (\"tail emission\"):\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e * Suppose I have two blockchains, one with a constant block subsidy, and one which had a block subsidy but the block subsidy has become negligible or zero.\n\u003e\u003e * Now consider a censoring miner.\n\u003e\u003e * If the miner rejects particular transactions (i.e. \"censors\") the miner loses out on the fees of those transactions.\n\u003e\u003e * Presumably, the miner does this because it gains other benefits from the censorship, economically equal or better to the earnings lost.\n\u003e\u003e * If the blockchain had a block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is small relative to the total earnings of each block.\n\u003e\u003e * If the blockchain had 0 block subsidy, then the loss the miner incurs is large relative to the total earnings of each block.\n\u003e\u003e * Thus, in the latter situation, the external benefit the miner gains from the censorship has to be proportionately larger than in the first situation.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Basically, the block subsidy is a market distortion: the block subsidy erodes the value of held coins to pay for the security of coins being moved.\n\u003e\u003e But the block subsidy is still issued whether or not coins being moved are censored or not censored.\n\u003e\u003e Thus, there is no incentive, considering only the block subsidy, to not censor coin movements.\n\u003e\u003e Only per-transaction fees have an incentive to not censor coin movements.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Thus, we should instead prepare for a future where the block subsidy must be removed, possibly before the existing schedule removes it, in case a majority coalition of miner ever decides to censor particular transactions without community consensus.\n\u003e\u003e Fortunately forcing the block subsidy to 0 is a softfork and thus easier to deploy.\n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e \n\u003e\u003e Regards,\n\u003e\u003e ZmnSCPxj\n\u003e\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev",
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