📅 Original date posted:2014-09-13
📝 Original message:On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 10:59 PM, Mark van Cuijk <mark at coinqy.com> wrote:
> If you do so, please make sure the length of the hash is included in the PaymentDetails/PaymentRequest. If someone parses the URI and doesn’t have an authenticated way of knowing the expected length of the hash, a MITM attacker can just truncate the hash to lower security.
But if they can truncate they can just as well pass a completely
different hash that matches their payment request. If an attacker can
change the bitcoin: URI, this scheme is broken.
The point of the proposal is to make sure that the payment request
matches the URI. So *if* you communicate the URI by secure means, this
authenticates the associated payment request as well, even if fetched
by insecure means (such as http:...) itself.
Wladimir
Wladimir [ARCHIVE] /
npub1xq…ymc2p
2023-06-07 15:25:44
in reply to nevent1q…ed4h
Author Public Key
npub1xqshkqv2g7uea4xzqwvmgjcz7u8vfavw6aazs999v0azsv3w7u3qpymc2pPublished at
2023-06-07 15:25:44Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2014-09-13\n📝 Original message:On Fri, Sep 12, 2014 at 10:59 PM, Mark van Cuijk \u003cmark at coinqy.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e If you do so, please make sure the length of the hash is included in the PaymentDetails/PaymentRequest. If someone parses the URI and doesn’t have an authenticated way of knowing the expected length of the hash, a MITM attacker can just truncate the hash to lower security.\n\nBut if they can truncate they can just as well pass a completely\ndifferent hash that matches their payment request. If an attacker can\nchange the bitcoin: URI, this scheme is broken.\n\nThe point of the proposal is to make sure that the payment request\nmatches the URI. So *if* you communicate the URI by secure means, this\nauthenticates the associated payment request as well, even if fetched\nby insecure means (such as http:...) itself.\n\nWladimir",
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