📅 Original date posted:2015-06-29
📝 Original message:On 6/28/2015 10:07 PM, Peter Todd wrote:
> Worryingly large payment providers have shown
> willingness(4) to consider extreme measures such as entering into legal
> contracts directly with large miners to ensure their transactions get mined.
> This is a significant centralization risk and it is not practical or even
> possible for small miners to enter into these contracts, leading to a situation
> where moving your hashing power to a larger pool will result in higher profits
> from hashing power contracts; if these payment providers secure a majority of
> hashing power with these contracts inevitably there will be a temptation to
> kick non-compliant miners off the network entirely with a 51% attack.
>
Your incomprehensible meddling with successful usage patterns threatens
to have unintended consequences directly in opposition to your own
stated goal of decentralization. And yet you persist.
As we deliberately break things and turn the P2P network into a
completely unpredictable hodge-podge of relay policies, we should expect
many more participants to bypass the P2P network entirely.
Many of the pieces are already in place.
If we wanted the P2P network to have more predicable behavior, it would
be possible for nodes to provide incentives to their neighbors. For
example, if you had a pair of nodes, you could test your peers to see
that they actually do relay "standard" transactions. This would have
emergent usability benefits for the P2P network as a whole.
Tom Harding [ARCHIVE] /
npub1ms…pmwjy
2023-06-07 15:41:13
in reply to nevent1q…zq3p
Author Public Key
npub1msef5qkfwz4t7qacwxz775wgdtlytph78g2g2z903x90874u263sypmwjyPublished at
2023-06-07 15:41:13Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-06-29\n📝 Original message:On 6/28/2015 10:07 PM, Peter Todd wrote:\n\u003e Worryingly large payment providers have shown\n\u003e willingness(4) to consider extreme measures such as entering into legal\n\u003e contracts directly with large miners to ensure their transactions get mined.\n\u003e This is a significant centralization risk and it is not practical or even\n\u003e possible for small miners to enter into these contracts, leading to a situation\n\u003e where moving your hashing power to a larger pool will result in higher profits\n\u003e from hashing power contracts; if these payment providers secure a majority of\n\u003e hashing power with these contracts inevitably there will be a temptation to\n\u003e kick non-compliant miners off the network entirely with a 51% attack.\n\u003e\n\nYour incomprehensible meddling with successful usage patterns threatens \nto have unintended consequences directly in opposition to your own \nstated goal of decentralization. And yet you persist.\n\nAs we deliberately break things and turn the P2P network into a \ncompletely unpredictable hodge-podge of relay policies, we should expect \nmany more participants to bypass the P2P network entirely.\n\nMany of the pieces are already in place.\n\nIf we wanted the P2P network to have more predicable behavior, it would \nbe possible for nodes to provide incentives to their neighbors. For \nexample, if you had a pair of nodes, you could test your peers to see \nthat they actually do relay \"standard\" transactions. This would have \nemergent usability benefits for the P2P network as a whole.",
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