đź“… Original date posted:2021-06-27
đź“ť Original message:Hello Eric,
I have few questions:
>Â Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are off on a chain split.
So majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game theory?Â
> And activation without majority hash power certainly does not “ensure” this.
Do miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling readiness for soft fork?Â
> If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It’s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that’s your vote.
Who enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners?
Is soft fork signaling same as voting?
According to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting including some mining pools and exchanges.
--
Prayank
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Prayank [ARCHIVE] /
npub1xw…c2lxh
2023-06-07 22:55:40
in reply to nevent1q…3k7x
Author Public Key
npub1xwdym5sne88xldc5809azwrgasp60ze27easgew8e7p3vj7qr7ssjc2lxhPublished at
2023-06-07 22:55:40Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2021-06-27\n📝 Original message:Hello Eric,\nI have few questions:\n\n\u003e Without majority hash power support, activation simply means you are off on a chain split. \n\nSo majority hash power not following the consensus rules can result in chain split? Why would majority of miners decide to mine a chain that nobody wants to use? What are different things possible in this case based on game theory? \n\n\u003e And activation without majority hash power certainly does not “ensure” this.\n\nDo miners and mining pools participate in discussions before signaling for a soft fork begins? Can they still mine something else post activation even if signaling readiness for soft fork? \n\n\u003e If one wants to enforce a soft fork (or otherwise censor) this is accomplished by mining (or paying others to do so). Anyone can mine, so everyone gets a say. Mining is trading capital now for more later. If enough people want to do that, they can enforce a soft fork. It’s time Bitcoiners stop thinking of miners as other people. Anyone can mine, and that’s your vote.\n\nWho enforces consensus rules technically in Bitcoin? Full nodes or Miners?\n\nIs soft fork signaling same as voting?\n\nAccording to my understanding, miners follow the consensus rules enforced by full nodes and get (subsidy + fees) for their work. Signaling is not voting although lot of people consider it voting including some mining pools and exchanges.\n\n\n-- \n Prayank\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20210627/37586cb5/attachment.html\u003e",
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