Jorge Tim贸n [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 馃搮 Original date posted:2015-08-06 馃摑 Original message:Really, thanks again for ...
馃搮 Original date posted:2015-08-06
馃摑 Original message:Really, thanks again for replying and not getting mad when I get your
thoughts wrong.
I believe that I've learned more about your position on the subject
today than in months of discussion and blogs (that's not a critique to
your blog post, it's just that they didn't answer to some questions
that I personally needed responded).
On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 9:42 PM, Gavin Andresen <gavinandresen at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 1:15 PM, Jorge Tim贸n <jtimon at jtimon.cc> wrote:
>>
>> So I reformulate the question:
>>
>> 1) If "not now", when will it be a good time to let the "market
>> minimum fee for miners to mine a transaction" rise above zero?
>
>
> Two answers:
>
> 1. If you are willing to wait an infinite amount of time, I think the
> minimum fee will always be zero or very close to zero, so I think it's a
> silly question.
I'm very happy to have made the stupid question then. It has revealed
another big difference in the fundamental assumptions we're using.
My assumption is that for any reasonable size, free transactions will
eventually disappear (assuming Bitcoin doesn't "fail" for some other
reason).
Maybe I'm being too optimistic about the demand side of the market in
the long term.
In contrast, your assumption seems to be (and please correct me on
anything I get wrong) that...
"The limit will always be big enough so that free transactions are
mined forever. Therefore fees just allow users to prioritize their
urgent transactions and relay policies to protect their nodes against
DoS attacks.
Well, obviously, they also serve to pay for mining in a low-subsidy
future, but even with the presence of free transactions, fees will be
enough to cover mining costs, or a new mechanisms will be developed to
make a low-total-reward blockchain safe or expensive proof of work
will be replaced or complemented with something else that's cheaper.
The main point is that fees are not a mechanism to decide what gets
priced out of the blockchain, because advancements in technology will
always give as enough room for free transactions."
- jtimon putting words in Gavin's mouth, with the only intention to
understand him better.
I'm using "free transactions" even though you said "zero or very close to zero".
To you, "zero or very close to zero" may be the same thing, but to me
zero and very close to zero are like...different galaxies.
To me, entering the "very close to zero galaxy" is a huge step in the
development of the fee market.
I've been always assuming that moving from zero to 1 satoshi was
precisely what "big block advocates" wanted to avoid.
What they meant by "Bitcoin is going to become a high-value only
network" and similar things.
Knowing that for "big block advocates" zero and "very close to zero"
are equally acceptable changes things.
> 2. The "market minimum fee" should be determined by the market. It should
> not be up to us to decide "when is a good time."
I completely agree, but the block size limit is a consensus rule that
doesn't adapt to the market. The market will adapt to whatever limit
is chosen by the consensus rules.
>> 2) Do you have any criterion (automatic or not) that can result in you
>> saying "no, this is too much" for any proposed size?
>
>
> Sure, if keeping up with transaction volume requires a cluster of computers
> or more than "pretty good" broadband bandwidth I think that's too far.
> That's where original 20MB limit comes from, otherwise I'd have proposed a
> much higher limit.
>
>> Would you agree that blocksize increase proposals should have such a
>> criterion/test?
>
>
> Although I've been very clear with my criterion, no, I don't think all
> blocksize increase proposals should have to justify "why this size" or "why
> this rate of increase."
I would really like a more formal criterion, ideally automatic (like
any other test, the parameters can be modified as technology
advances).
But fair enough, even though your criterion is too vague or not
future-proof enough, I guess it is still a criterion.
It seems that this is a matter of disagreements and ideal ways of
doing things and not really a disagreement on fundamental assumptions.
So it seems this question wasn't so interesting after all.
> Part of my frustration with this whole debate is
> we're talking about a sanity-check upper-limit; as long as it doesn't open
> up some terrible new DoS possibility I don't think it really matters much
> what the exact number is.
That's what you think you are discussing, but I (and probably some
other people) think we are discussing something entirely different.
Because we have a fundamentally different assumption on what the block
size limit is about.
I really hope that identifying these "fundamental assumption
discrepancies" (FAD from now own) will help us avoid circular
discussions so that everything is less frustrating and more productive
for everyone.
>> Regardless of the history of the consensus rule (which I couldn't care
>> less about), I believe the only function that the maximum block size
>> rule currently serves is limiting centralization.
>> Since you deny that function, do you think the (artificial) consensus
>> rule is currently serving any other purpose that I'm missing?
>
>
> It prevents trivial denial-of-service attacks (e.g. I promise to send you a
> 1 Terabyte block, then fill up your memory or disk...).
This could be prevented in some other ways. If this is the only
concern, it doesn't need to be a consensus rule.
> And please read what I wrote: I said that the block limit has LITTLE effect
> on MINING centralization. Not "no effect on any type of centralization."
>
> If the limit was removed entirely, it is certainly possible we'd end up with
> very few organizations (and perhaps zero individuals) running full nodes.
Sorry, another try:
You think the maximum block size rule serves to limit centralization
by limiting how hard it is to run a full node.
I agree with that, but I would add something more and you wouldn't:
The maximum block size consensus rule limits how hard it is to be a
competitive miner.
In other words, you think the last statement is false or incorrect.
Meta: I think we should try to collect and list more of this "FADs"
(we have at least 2 of them already). If you think it can be useful,
I'm more than happy to repeat this process in the opposite direction:
you make the questions and I give the answers, you write what you
think I think and I correct you in iterations. Probably we should
finish with you correcting what I think you think first. I am really
excited about understanding your point of view better.
Stupid humor (hopefully not out of context and not offensive): I'm
happy to discover that what I thought it was FUD was just FAD.
More seriously, I'm really happy for your interest in understanding
and being understood.
Let's worry about where do we think differently first and about who is
right on each point later.
In the end, only the conclusions on each point will matter and not who
claimed the final conclusions (in the points where we find them) first
(if we get to final common conclusions on that point at all).
Published at
2023-06-07 15:44:55Event JSON
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"content": "馃搮 Original date posted:2015-08-06\n馃摑 Original message:Really, thanks again for replying and not getting mad when I get your\nthoughts wrong.\nI believe that I've learned more about your position on the subject\ntoday than in months of discussion and blogs (that's not a critique to\nyour blog post, it's just that they didn't answer to some questions\nthat I personally needed responded).\n\nOn Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 9:42 PM, Gavin Andresen \u003cgavinandresen at gmail.com\u003e wrote:\n\u003e On Thu, Aug 6, 2015 at 1:15 PM, Jorge Tim贸n \u003cjtimon at jtimon.cc\u003e wrote:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e So I reformulate the question:\n\u003e\u003e\n\u003e\u003e 1) If \"not now\", when will it be a good time to let the \"market\n\u003e\u003e minimum fee for miners to mine a transaction\" rise above zero?\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Two answers:\n\u003e\n\u003e 1. If you are willing to wait an infinite amount of time, I think the\n\u003e minimum fee will always be zero or very close to zero, so I think it's a\n\u003e silly question.\n\nI'm very happy to have made the stupid question then. It has revealed\nanother big difference in the fundamental assumptions we're using.\n\nMy assumption is that for any reasonable size, free transactions will\neventually disappear (assuming Bitcoin doesn't \"fail\" for some other\nreason).\nMaybe I'm being too optimistic about the demand side of the market in\nthe long term.\n\nIn contrast, your assumption seems to be (and please correct me on\nanything I get wrong) that...\n\n\"The limit will always be big enough so that free transactions are\nmined forever. Therefore fees just allow users to prioritize their\nurgent transactions and relay policies to protect their nodes against\nDoS attacks.\nWell, obviously, they also serve to pay for mining in a low-subsidy\nfuture, but even with the presence of free transactions, fees will be\nenough to cover mining costs, or a new mechanisms will be developed to\nmake a low-total-reward blockchain safe or expensive proof of work\nwill be replaced or complemented with something else that's cheaper.\nThe main point is that fees are not a mechanism to decide what gets\npriced out of the blockchain, because advancements in technology will\nalways give as enough room for free transactions.\"\n- jtimon putting words in Gavin's mouth, with the only intention to\nunderstand him better.\n\nI'm using \"free transactions\" even though you said \"zero or very close to zero\".\nTo you, \"zero or very close to zero\" may be the same thing, but to me\nzero and very close to zero are like...different galaxies.\nTo me, entering the \"very close to zero galaxy\" is a huge step in the\ndevelopment of the fee market.\nI've been always assuming that moving from zero to 1 satoshi was\nprecisely what \"big block advocates\" wanted to avoid.\nWhat they meant by \"Bitcoin is going to become a high-value only\nnetwork\" and similar things.\nKnowing that for \"big block advocates\" zero and \"very close to zero\"\nare equally acceptable changes things.\n\n\u003e 2. The \"market minimum fee\" should be determined by the market. It should\n\u003e not be up to us to decide \"when is a good time.\"\n\nI completely agree, but the block size limit is a consensus rule that\ndoesn't adapt to the market. The market will adapt to whatever limit\nis chosen by the consensus rules.\n\n\u003e\u003e 2) Do you have any criterion (automatic or not) that can result in you\n\u003e\u003e saying \"no, this is too much\" for any proposed size?\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Sure, if keeping up with transaction volume requires a cluster of computers\n\u003e or more than \"pretty good\" broadband bandwidth I think that's too far.\n\u003e That's where original 20MB limit comes from, otherwise I'd have proposed a\n\u003e much higher limit.\n\u003e\n\u003e\u003e Would you agree that blocksize increase proposals should have such a\n\u003e\u003e criterion/test?\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Although I've been very clear with my criterion, no, I don't think all\n\u003e blocksize increase proposals should have to justify \"why this size\" or \"why\n\u003e this rate of increase.\"\n\nI would really like a more formal criterion, ideally automatic (like\nany other test, the parameters can be modified as technology\nadvances).\nBut fair enough, even though your criterion is too vague or not\nfuture-proof enough, I guess it is still a criterion.\nIt seems that this is a matter of disagreements and ideal ways of\ndoing things and not really a disagreement on fundamental assumptions.\nSo it seems this question wasn't so interesting after all.\n\n\u003e Part of my frustration with this whole debate is\n\u003e we're talking about a sanity-check upper-limit; as long as it doesn't open\n\u003e up some terrible new DoS possibility I don't think it really matters much\n\u003e what the exact number is.\n\nThat's what you think you are discussing, but I (and probably some\nother people) think we are discussing something entirely different.\nBecause we have a fundamentally different assumption on what the block\nsize limit is about.\nI really hope that identifying these \"fundamental assumption\ndiscrepancies\" (FAD from now own) will help us avoid circular\ndiscussions so that everything is less frustrating and more productive\nfor everyone.\n\n\u003e\u003e Regardless of the history of the consensus rule (which I couldn't care\n\u003e\u003e less about), I believe the only function that the maximum block size\n\u003e\u003e rule currently serves is limiting centralization.\n\u003e\u003e Since you deny that function, do you think the (artificial) consensus\n\u003e\u003e rule is currently serving any other purpose that I'm missing?\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e It prevents trivial denial-of-service attacks (e.g. I promise to send you a\n\u003e 1 Terabyte block, then fill up your memory or disk...).\n\nThis could be prevented in some other ways. If this is the only\nconcern, it doesn't need to be a consensus rule.\n\n\u003e And please read what I wrote: I said that the block limit has LITTLE effect\n\u003e on MINING centralization. Not \"no effect on any type of centralization.\"\n\u003e\n\u003e If the limit was removed entirely, it is certainly possible we'd end up with\n\u003e very few organizations (and perhaps zero individuals) running full nodes.\n\nSorry, another try:\n\nYou think the maximum block size rule serves to limit centralization\nby limiting how hard it is to run a full node.\nI agree with that, but I would add something more and you wouldn't:\n\nThe maximum block size consensus rule limits how hard it is to be a\ncompetitive miner.\n\nIn other words, you think the last statement is false or incorrect.\n\nMeta: I think we should try to collect and list more of this \"FADs\"\n(we have at least 2 of them already). If you think it can be useful,\nI'm more than happy to repeat this process in the opposite direction:\nyou make the questions and I give the answers, you write what you\nthink I think and I correct you in iterations. Probably we should\nfinish with you correcting what I think you think first. I am really\nexcited about understanding your point of view better.\n\nStupid humor (hopefully not out of context and not offensive): I'm\nhappy to discover that what I thought it was FUD was just FAD.\nMore seriously, I'm really happy for your interest in understanding\nand being understood.\nLet's worry about where do we think differently first and about who is\nright on each point later.\nIn the end, only the conclusions on each point will matter and not who\nclaimed the final conclusions (in the points where we find them) first\n(if we get to final common conclusions on that point at all).",
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