📅 Original date posted:2018-11-08
📝 Original message:>The problem will be to come up with an address authentication
procedure that will be convenient for users and widely supported, as a
result.
You could locally hash the destination address and from the hash derive a
BIP39 style list of 12 words for visual comparison. I would advise against
using color or graphics -- the brain is too good at "snapping" to an
expected perception when it is running in graphics mode instead of symbolic
mode.
On Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 4:41 AM Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> > Copying addresses to the clipboard should be discouraged, rather than
> > supported.
>
> Do you know any reasonably convenient mechanism for end user to
> transfer an address from, say, a web page to the wallet address
> input field ?
>
> The clipboard is just a low-hanging fruit for malware, anyway. It just
> the most easy point to replace an address. If the computer is
> compromized, malware can edit the web page in the memory of the browser
> process, for example. If it shown as QR code, malware can decode,
> detect that it is an address, and replace the image of QR code.
>
> I think that the only way to protect from this is to add some form of
> authentication for an address - 2fa (transfer checksum via second
> channel), visual fingerprints for addresses, that will are hard to
> detect (and hence, replace) for malware, signing the destination address
> with the key of an address that is already known and checking the
> signature, etc.
>
> The problem will be to come up with an address authentication procedure
> that will be convenient for users and widely supported, as a result.
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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Moral Agent [ARCHIVE] /
npub1gh…gc6pd
2023-06-07 18:15:11
in reply to nevent1q…utfg
Author Public Key
npub1ghl954l59wm5pnv8j2y0ymmp6dt70kx2037e06wavfut7gjh68hqdgc6pdPublished at
2023-06-07 18:15:11Event JSON
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"pubkey": "45fe5a57f42bb740cd879288f26f61d357e7d8ca7c7d97e9dd6278bf2257d1ee",
"created_at": 1686161711,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2018-11-08\n📝 Original message:\u003eThe problem will be to come up with an address authentication\nprocedure that will be convenient for users and widely supported, as a\nresult.\n\nYou could locally hash the destination address and from the hash derive a\nBIP39 style list of 12 words for visual comparison. I would advise against\nusing color or graphics -- the brain is too good at \"snapping\" to an\nexpected perception when it is running in graphics mode instead of symbolic\nmode.\n\n\nOn Thu, Nov 8, 2018 at 4:41 AM Dmitry Petukhov via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Copying addresses to the clipboard should be discouraged, rather than\n\u003e \u003e supported.\n\u003e\n\u003e Do you know any reasonably convenient mechanism for end user to\n\u003e transfer an address from, say, a web page to the wallet address\n\u003e input field ?\n\u003e\n\u003e The clipboard is just a low-hanging fruit for malware, anyway. It just\n\u003e the most easy point to replace an address. If the computer is\n\u003e compromized, malware can edit the web page in the memory of the browser\n\u003e process, for example. If it shown as QR code, malware can decode,\n\u003e detect that it is an address, and replace the image of QR code.\n\u003e\n\u003e I think that the only way to protect from this is to add some form of\n\u003e authentication for an address - 2fa (transfer checksum via second\n\u003e channel), visual fingerprints for addresses, that will are hard to\n\u003e detect (and hence, replace) for malware, signing the destination address\n\u003e with the key of an address that is already known and checking the\n\u003e signature, etc.\n\u003e\n\u003e The problem will be to come up with an address authentication procedure\n\u003e that will be convenient for users and widely supported, as a result.\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20181108/2123a8e6/attachment.html\u003e",
"sig": "83229ce76a3e7f3e068a1d3ce76e68586827f46b699669ba529c94cd7a1f9fd9b0dca66241e350d97d0dfe6cb51f466e9aa2abee5c603ff2cfe42c939aed513a"
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