š
Original date posted:2015-02-22
š Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
On 02/22/2015 10:17 AM, Natanael wrote:
> The problem with this approach is that it is worthless as a
> predictor. We aren't dealing with traffic safety and road design -
> we are dealing with adaptive attackers and malicious miners and
> pools.
>
> Anything which does not invalidate blocks carrying doublespends
> WILL allow malicious miners and pools to conspire with thieves to
> steal money. The probability of being hit will then be (their
> proliferation in your business area) * (their fraction of the
> mining power).
>
> That might seem to give small numbers for most sets of reasonable
> assumptions. But the problem is that's only an average, and the
> people being hit might have small profit margins - one successful
> attack can place hundreds of merchants in red numbers and force
> them to shut down.
>
> You should never expose yourself to attacks which you can't defend
> against and which can be fatal. In particular not if there's
> nothing in the environment that is capable of limiting the size or
> numbers of any attacks. And there's no such thing today in
> Bitcoin.
>
> This is why I sketched out the multisignature notary approach, and
> why some decided to extend that approach with collateral
> (NoRiskWallet) to further reduce trust in the notary. This is the
> single most practical approach I know of today to achieve ACTUAL
> SECURITY for unconfirmed transactions.
>
> Don't like it? See if you can do better!
>
> Just don't rely on zero-confirmation transactions!
You just disproved your own argument.
It is possible to predict risk, and therefore to price the risk.
You also noted that for some Bitcoin users, the price of that risk is
too high for the types of transactions in which wish to engage.
In what way does that translated into a universal requirement for
everybody to use multisignature notaries?
Surely the users who can afford the risk can use zero conf if they
like, and those who can't can use multisig notaries?
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJU6gLmAAoJECpf2nDq2eYj8/AQAJfMtBqjo1Z2Z0A7OhE9iaYD
PqWXdRaCFwyV49RSDrRROrB9Vc7CENQsweHBSnNEmSj6la/YfjyobmaR5BMtTq73
ZaXOFYSGVa9S0j+1qTvz2MorBd6ocxckdunfN7N/uVb4NQRYTHUT8N7AyJgRFYO9
ElQU/8TcNCSRqSQc3z8rnUc8eN1+DgqkMDHM754huOgA0fz0OlxnLCddcCvLr0t7
ZPCtZI94FWQSWhzTK2oa41hh01xG+Eg5GhqGzM7WBqM6+d/CgNcUVeMnVOkkhgav
AmlE81Km9R4AlrsGT/CcGgaC+FvBhqmDYHAGOUG3hLP+MXMe4qA5TRoRKHFvq4Gw
nF6q+leI7z/TkKeiDcyEKKen5cU01SnZlVRnncccIxsjzNjCiBdXOTP6o0pTd34j
5VJQ04mF4sla5AaaSDtsbkZuMdqIZDMn1tWxbmXRQ2cUbCGoi4yYiUlqjetrs4e1
i7NopccLNVDwjGRRnaSs4KkpuW7s23XwKm6WVehrP7S9s1Bqc+84C/rL1G4IF3Ul
vOz+dfxpS+yeGdEDOxb92voKo+fvL/N1sH2+cqTemuYWArDOn1kK/qKdaEfnl9p2
VcPJWuik6Ywomg4fCWmTQWcDxbWiUT/Gb/niONOYQ6iJG7mU4SH9LFBDd8qV+ljN
RqUYrOBf/PaMneNxwJp+
=w36r
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: 0xEAD9E623.asc
Type: application/pgp-keys
Size: 17528 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150222/1008c914/attachment.bin>;
Justus Ranvier [ARCHIVE] /
npub1k2ā¦9qd6m
2023-06-07 15:30:55
in reply to nevent1qā¦xwx7
Author Public Key
npub1k2eekmevs6gg60df75qpjw4a2atmy89vx28c8zqq5jxy64tuzrws39qd6mPublished at
2023-06-07 15:30:55Event JSON
{
"id": "f31b24ab18df3ff30b10dbbe2a7cfaa9763c5956a2dce871ce7dab79a9c94ae8",
"pubkey": "b2b39b6f2c86908d3da9f500193abd5757b21cac328f838800a48c4d557c10dd",
"created_at": 1686151855,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"00335b798bd3386560c6501fdcb4ac491a0b697640f4bb1d0fb0617840851a89",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"58d20cd54e9acc1d6b009c24a57675480405aac1b2048e51c132ac675bfc7bfc",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"f14f3c71a4e63a12c842e4a50471263ada4b6cfde093fcb6588693a726b9b018"
]
],
"content": "š
Original date posted:2015-02-22\nš Original message:-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA1\n\nOn 02/22/2015 10:17 AM, Natanael wrote:\n\u003e The problem with this approach is that it is worthless as a\n\u003e predictor. We aren't dealing with traffic safety and road design -\n\u003e we are dealing with adaptive attackers and malicious miners and\n\u003e pools.\n\u003e \n\u003e Anything which does not invalidate blocks carrying doublespends\n\u003e WILL allow malicious miners and pools to conspire with thieves to\n\u003e steal money. The probability of being hit will then be (their\n\u003e proliferation in your business area) * (their fraction of the\n\u003e mining power).\n\u003e \n\u003e That might seem to give small numbers for most sets of reasonable \n\u003e assumptions. But the problem is that's only an average, and the\n\u003e people being hit might have small profit margins - one successful\n\u003e attack can place hundreds of merchants in red numbers and force\n\u003e them to shut down.\n\u003e \n\u003e You should never expose yourself to attacks which you can't defend\n\u003e against and which can be fatal. In particular not if there's\n\u003e nothing in the environment that is capable of limiting the size or\n\u003e numbers of any attacks. And there's no such thing today in\n\u003e Bitcoin.\n\u003e \n\u003e This is why I sketched out the multisignature notary approach, and\n\u003e why some decided to extend that approach with collateral\n\u003e (NoRiskWallet) to further reduce trust in the notary. This is the\n\u003e single most practical approach I know of today to achieve ACTUAL\n\u003e SECURITY for unconfirmed transactions.\n\u003e \n\u003e Don't like it? See if you can do better!\n\u003e \n\u003e Just don't rely on zero-confirmation transactions!\n\nYou just disproved your own argument.\n\nIt is possible to predict risk, and therefore to price the risk.\n\nYou also noted that for some Bitcoin users, the price of that risk is\ntoo high for the types of transactions in which wish to engage.\n\nIn what way does that translated into a universal requirement for\neverybody to use multisignature notaries?\n\nSurely the users who can afford the risk can use zero conf if they\nlike, and those who can't can use multisig notaries?\n-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----\n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\nRqUYrOBf/PaMneNxwJp+\n=w36r\n-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----\n-------------- next part --------------\nA non-text attachment was scrubbed...\nName: 0xEAD9E623.asc\nType: application/pgp-keys\nSize: 17528 bytes\nDesc: not available\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150222/1008c914/attachment.bin\u003e",
"sig": "5925f9d129303eef96c188035f1e0e2fea84fcd4b213341c56c677ddb4dc7a14390fd8be19f36392b1a7583e36fdf6709fd24bd8afd6bfe262a008b165323161"
}