Paul Sztorc [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2015-10-14 📝 Original message:On 10/14/2015 6:37 PM, s7r ...
📅 Original date posted:2015-10-14
📝 Original message:On 10/14/2015 6:37 PM, s7r wrote:
> On 10/14/2015 6:19 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote:
> > LN transactions are a substitute good for on-chain transactions.
>
> > Therefore, demand for on-chain transactions will decrease as a
> > result of LN, meaning that fees will be lower than they would
> > otherwise be.
>
> > However, the two are also perfect compliments, as LN transactions
> > cannot take place at all without periodic on-chain transactions.
>
> > The demand for *all* Bitcoin transactions (LN and otherwise) is
> > itself a function of innumerable factors, one of which is the
> > question "Which form of money [Bitcoin or not-Bitcoin] do I think
> > my trading partners will be using?". By supporting a higher rate of
> > (higher-quality) Bitcoin transactions, the net result is highly
> > uncertain, but will probably be that LN actually increases trading
> > fees.
>
> Probably yes. But probably no. Having less hashing power is not good,
> and it's unrelated to scalability and decentralization, it's related
> to security. Of course we could argue that the hashing power is not
> super decentralized at this moment but it's unrelated to the topic.
Who are you talking to? Who said anything about any of this? If you are
talking to me, please don't imply that I don't already know these things.
>
> I'd rather have less decentralized big amount of hashing power as
> opposite to less hashing power.
>
> One theory, very close to yours, is that if Bitcoin transactions
> demand grows so high that we need the lightning network, there should
> be plenty of on chain transactions for miners to collect fees from.
For a given fee amount, LN transactions are worse than on-chain
transactions. So people would only use LN if they preferred cheaper txns.
>
> I haven't yet seen the incentives of everyone involved in lightning
> network (payment channel end points, hub operators, miners, etc.) but
> would it make sense to enforce a % of the fees collected by on payment
> hubs to be spent as miner fees, regardless if the transactions from
> that hub go on the main chain or not?
If you want fees to go up, either decrease supply (lower the blocksize
limit) or increase demand (a popular Bitcoin). There's no need to do
anything roundabout.
Regards,
Paul
Published at
2023-06-07 17:43:26Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-10-14\n📝 Original message:On 10/14/2015 6:37 PM, s7r wrote:\n\u003e On 10/14/2015 6:19 PM, Paul Sztorc wrote:\n\u003e \u003e LN transactions are a substitute good for on-chain transactions.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e Therefore, demand for on-chain transactions will decrease as a\n\u003e \u003e result of LN, meaning that fees will be lower than they would\n\u003e \u003e otherwise be.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e However, the two are also perfect compliments, as LN transactions\n\u003e \u003e cannot take place at all without periodic on-chain transactions.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e The demand for *all* Bitcoin transactions (LN and otherwise) is\n\u003e \u003e itself a function of innumerable factors, one of which is the\n\u003e \u003e question \"Which form of money [Bitcoin or not-Bitcoin] do I think\n\u003e \u003e my trading partners will be using?\". By supporting a higher rate of\n\u003e \u003e (higher-quality) Bitcoin transactions, the net result is highly\n\u003e \u003e uncertain, but will probably be that LN actually increases trading\n\u003e \u003e fees.\n\u003e\n\u003e Probably yes. But probably no. Having less hashing power is not good,\n\u003e and it's unrelated to scalability and decentralization, it's related\n\u003e to security. Of course we could argue that the hashing power is not\n\u003e super decentralized at this moment but it's unrelated to the topic.\nWho are you talking to? Who said anything about any of this? If you are\ntalking to me, please don't imply that I don't already know these things.\n\n\u003e\n\u003e I'd rather have less decentralized big amount of hashing power as\n\u003e opposite to less hashing power.\n\u003e\n\u003e One theory, very close to yours, is that if Bitcoin transactions\n\u003e demand grows so high that we need the lightning network, there should\n\u003e be plenty of on chain transactions for miners to collect fees from.\nFor a given fee amount, LN transactions are worse than on-chain\ntransactions. So people would only use LN if they preferred cheaper txns.\n\u003e\n\u003e I haven't yet seen the incentives of everyone involved in lightning\n\u003e network (payment channel end points, hub operators, miners, etc.) but\n\u003e would it make sense to enforce a % of the fees collected by on payment\n\u003e hubs to be spent as miner fees, regardless if the transactions from\n\u003e that hub go on the main chain or not?\nIf you want fees to go up, either decrease supply (lower the blocksize\nlimit) or increase demand (a popular Bitcoin). There's no need to do\nanything roundabout.\n\nRegards,\nPaul",
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