Dan Gould [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2023-05-10 🗒️ Summary of this message: Payjoin, an ...

📅 Original date posted:2023-05-10
🗒️ Summary of this message: Payjoin, an interactive settlement batching method, can significantly reduce fee expenditure and blockchain throughput while improving Bitcoin's privacy. It breaks the assumption that all transaction inputs belong to the same person and can be used for individual and enterprise circumstances.
📝 Original message:Hi list, The following message details a number of examples using payjoin P2EP to coordinate payment batches. I stray from the original shape of stenographic payjoin, what I call "canonical payjoin" with 2 inputs and many outputs, to describe what I believe are novel structures that break heuristics used to track batched payments. The later examples match typical batch structure while breaking common input heuristic.

I'm curious to hear any feedback or concerns with these methods. This work is written in a less technical register than this list may be used to, but bitcoin-dev is the best forum to request for a critique of the thinking.

Thanks,
Dan

—

INTERACTIVE PAYMENT BATCHING IS BETTER

## Payjoin for More Than Privacy

A high fee bitcoin always [triggers](https://twitter.com/BTCsessions/status/1655733065426296832) a [search](https://twitter.com/w_s_bitcoin/status/1655885695762808832) for more efficient use of blockspace. Blockchain is a slow database, and batching has got to be one of the oldest ways to optimize a database. Lightning is interactive payment batching based on intermittent settlement. Payjoin is interactive settlement batching. Merchant to customer payjoin is what led to the formal spec. No surprise then that a merchant / customer frame stuck versus a frame payment batching like lightning. Lightning has been batching for scaling all along. The following outlines how payjoin fits into batched transfer settlement infrastructure and how it helps prepare for the next wave of blockspace scarcity.

The term "payjoin" is used to describe both an interactive way to build transactions between peers on the web, aka Pay-to-Endpoint (P2EP), and an ambiguous transaction structure, typically with many inputs and two outputs that I dub *canonical payjoin*. Canonical payjoin looks like transaction behavior that any wallet could make, but its inputs actually come from more than one person. Breaking the assumption that all transaction inputs belong to the same person breaks the foundation of blockchain surveillance and the sole privacy problem left open in Satoshi's whitepaper. In an effort to improve bitcoin's privacy through payjoin adoption, I outline a number of ways payjoin can significantly reduce fee expenditure and blockchain throughput in individual and enterprise circumstances. Some of these new techniques preserve privacy for transactions otherwise thought of as unambiguous and certainly traceable. The examples mostly ignore mining fees for the sake of simplicity.

## Before the Batch

### Paying Naively

Payjoin without the joi is just payn. ouch.

```
A's input0: 2 btc
A's input1: 3 btc
---
B's output0: 4 btc B's address0
A's output1: 1 btc A's change
```

A typical bitcoin transfer from `A`lice to `B`ob looks like this. Note that only the addresses and amounts are posted to chain with no further relation between inputs and outputs. The named labels are not. Third party analysts assume both inputs come from the same entity (because they usually do). They also assume `output0` is the payment because neither input is alone sufficient to make a payment of 4 btc.

### Canonical Payjoin

Payjoin foils that assumption because it lets Alice and Bob both contribute inputs. What would be interpreted as a naive payment might actually be a payjoin. Assuming both inputs always come from either Bob or Alice is wrong.

```pre
A's input0: 2 btc
B's input1: 3 btc
---
A's output1: 1 btc A's change
B's output0: 4 btc B's address0
```


Alice only paid 1 btc to `output0`'s 4 btc while merging it with Bob's 3 btc input txo too. Bob's 4 btc is not the 1 btc amount Alice paid, which is not visible.

## Enter Output Substitution

Payjoin [payment output substitution](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0078.mediawiki#payment-output-substitution) (`pjos`) lets a receiver like Bob substitute a proposed output with any outputs of equal amount. BIP 78 `pjos` is insecure over relayed communications and thus forbidden. BIP 78 receivers must run their own authenticated server to use `pjos`. [Serverless Payjoin](https://gist.github.com/DanGould/243e418752fff760c9f6b23bba8a32f9) secures relayed `pjos`.

The following examines the use of this technique to prevent address reuse, redirect funds to cold storage, forward payments, and batch transactions for massive fee savings.

### The Minimum Effective Interaction

Let's make not-quite-payjoin but something still fun. Call that Payjoi. Get it? Joy again? Hah 🥁💥.

If Bob's wallet is empty or he's using a cold wallet this would still work.

Imagine Bob's a bartender who posts the QR code for `bitcoin:address0?pj=https://payjoin.bob.cash` on an the wall at the bar.

Alice would scan it to propose the transaction as before, but Bob returns the payjoin proposal with one tiny change. In this way he keeps his tip private from nosy neighbors at the bar.

```pre
A's input0: 2 btc
A's input1: 3 btc
---
B's output0: 4 btc B's address1
A's output1: 1 btc A's change

```

See, Bob swapped `output0`'s `address0` for `address1`. Other patrons do not know of `address1` since Bob sent it online as a payjoin proposal. They can't look up what they don't know.

### Payment forwarding

Toys aside, substitution is powerful. What if Bob planned to pay his `C`loud provider next time he got paid. He could substitute `C`loudy's address instead of his `address1`.

```pre
A's input0: 2 btc
A's input1: 3 btc
---
C's output0: 4 btc C's address
A's output1: 1 btc A's change

```

Alice only sees `C`'s address as unique, and the payjoin proposal is authenticated by Bob, so both of them agree that this payjoin pays Bob. Since transactions are atomic, Bob takes no custody of the funds going to `C`loudy either.

Bob could also turn this into a canonical payjoin by adding input. Or instead, Bob could forward funds to his cold storage rather than to Cloudy. That could be valuable if Bob's payjoin server hot wallet had more funds than he was comfortable with keeping online. Alice even still pays the miner fee as she would in any case. Bob saves the blockspace, time, money and hassle of a making separate transaction to forward.

### Receiver side Payment Batching

We're going to make this more complex, because it scales bitcoin and it's fun.

Imagine Bob is an exchange sitting on a few low-priority withdrawal orders from `D`an of 0.6 btc and and `E`rin of 0.4 btc. When Alice proposes a deposit, Bob may substitute a single output with many, spreading the inbound amount across multiple addresses. Instead of just *address* substitution he substitutes the entire output with new ones.

```
A's input0: 2 btc
A's input1: 3 btc
---
B's output0: 0.99 btc B's address0
A's output1: 3 btc A's change
D's output2: 0.4 btc D's address
E's output3: 0.6 btc E's address

```

Batching saves mining fees for Bob since Alice already pays for some transaction fee. Bob can take any remaining mining fee costs from his increased transaction's size out of his own output, `address0` shown here receiving 0.99 btc to pay an additional 0.01 btc fee. Not shown, Bob could even split Cloudy's output from the prior example to forward Cloudy an exact invoice amount and keep the change.

[Prior](https://www.bullbitcoin.com/blog/announcing-batcher-by-bull-bitcoin-open-source-non-custodial-on-chain-wallet-batching-plugin-for-high-volume-bitcoin-enterprise-users) [art](https://blog.bitgo.com/utxo-management-for-enterprise-wallets-5357dad08dd1) [all](https://medium.com/@hasufly/an-analysis-of-batching-in-bitcoin-9bdf81a394e0) [explores](https://bitcoinops.org/en/payment-batching/) sender-batched transactions. It follows that inputs to batched transactions are assumed to belong to the cluster of the entity making payments (Bob, in this case). Receiver side payment batching kills this heuristic analysis, providing multiple new interpretations for payments of few inputs and many outputs.

### Lightning Channels

Yes, even [lightning channel payjoin](https://chaincase.app/words/lightning-payjoin) outputs are viable. Lightning channels are posted as 2-of-2 P2SH or P2TR addresses.

```
A's input0: 5 btc
---
B's output0: 2 btc B & his peer's ⚡️ channel
A's output1: 3 btc A's change

```

Bob's lightning output helps preserve privacy even moreso because it belongs to two parties, both Bob and his channel peer. When P2TR channels are the norm, a stranger would not even know that `output0` is for lightning. New standard lightning protocols allow for payjoin output splicing and dual funded channels to achieve the common input assumption-busting result even without BIP 78 as well.

### Mix and Batch 🥣

Combining it all forces multiple ambiguous interpretations of the transaction graph. With basic networking, and no coordinator, Both Alice and Bob can pay multiple parties beyond themselves, combine inputs and consolidate funds without fear for being censored.

Interaction lets multiple ambiguous possibilities converge to preserve bitcoin's inherent fungibility. No inconvenient, fee intensive, pre-scheduled, time consuming mixing step required.

#### Batch Sender and Receiver Transactions to Put a Cherry on Top 🍰

```
A's input0: 2 btc
B's input1: 4 btc
B's input2: 3 btc
---
B's output0: 1.5 btc B's address1
A's output1: 2 btc A's change
B's output2: 0.4 btc B's ⚡️ channel
C's output3: 2.5 btc C's address
E's output4: 1 btc E's address
D's output5: 0.6 btc D's address
F's output6: 1 btc F's address

```

Even though amounts aren't equal, these new payjoin constructions provide significant ambiguity to foil vast swaths of heuristic analysis being done today by breaking their most basic assumptions. Because of payjoin's intra-transaction transfers from Alice to Bob, [CoinJoin sudoku](http://www.coinjoinsudoku.com/advisory/) analysis does not apply.

Even Alice and Bob preserve some privacy in the other's view. Even though one knows the other's inputs, they cannot be certain that any of their counterpart's outputs will end up in their counterpart's wallet or if output substitution has been used.

## Progress before rainbows 🌈 and unicorns 🦄

Bob and Alice still know the subtransactions of their counterpart. As of today, Bob still needs to run a server. They each know which inputs belong to which counterpart. While p2p can do a lot, an adversarial counterparty could still report the other's chosen inputs and outputs to build a cluster with an analysis firm. I know those problems need to be solved, but look how far ahead a simple HTTP interaction can take us.

**Thanks** to Hunter Beast, Andrew "Kukks" Camilleri, Ishi, Kexkey, Francis Pouliot, and Yashraj for reading drafts of this.