📅 Original date posted:2022-02-26
📝 Original message:> m is how much people want to kill a sidechain, 0 = everybody would be sad
if it died and would rather burn all their BTC forever than continue living
Math is brutal
On Sat, Feb 26, 2022, 01:39 ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> Good morning Paul,
>
>
> > I don't think I can stop people from being ignorant about Drivechain.
> But I can at least allow the Drivechain-knowledgable to identify each other.
> >
> > So here below, I present a little "quiz". If you can answer all of these
> questions, then you basically understand Drivechain:
> >
> > 0. We could change DC to make miner-theft impossible, by making it a
> layer1 consensus rule that miners never steal. Why is this cure worse than
> the disease?
>
> Now miners are forced to look at all sideblocks, not optionally do so if
> it is profitable for them.
>
> > 1. If 100% hashrate wanted to steal coins from a DC sidechain *as
> quickly as possible*, how long would this take (in blocks)?
>
> 13,150 (I think this is how you changed it after feedback from this list,
> I think I remember it was ~3000 before or thereabouts.)
>
> > 2. Per sidechain per year (ie, per 52560 blocks), how many DC
> withdrawals can take place (maximum)? How many can be attempted?
> > (Ie, how does the 'train track metaphor' work, from ~1h5m in the
> "Overview and Misconceptions" video)?
>
> I hate watching videos, I can read faster than anyone can talk (except
> maybe Laolu, he speaks faster than I can process, never mind read).
>
> ~4 times (assuming 52560 block per year, which may vary due to new miners,
> hashrate drops, etc)
>
> > 3. Only two types of people should ever be using the DC withdrawal
> system at all.
> > 3a. Which two?
>
> a. Miners destroying the sidechain because the sidechain is no longer
> viable.
> b. Aggregators of sidechain-to-minechain transfers and large whales.
>
> > 3b. How is everyone else, expected to move their coins from chain to
> chain?
>
> Cross-system atomic swaps.
> (I use "System" here since the same mechanism works for Lightning
> channels, and channels are not blockchains.)
>
> > 3c. (Obviously, this improves UX.) But why does it also improve
> security?
>
> Drivechain-based pegged transfers are aggregates of many smaller transfers
> and thus every transfer out from the sidechain contributes its "fee" to the
> security of the peg.
>
> > --
> > 4. What do the parameters b and m stand for (in the DC security model)?
>
> m is how much people want to kill a sidechain, 0 = everybody would be sad
> if it died and would rather burn all their BTC forever than continue
> living, 1 = do not care, > 1 people want to actively kill the sidechain.
>
> b is how much profit a mainchain miner expects from supporting a sidechain
> (do not remember the unit though).
> Something like u = a + b where a is the mainchain, b is the sidechain, u
> is the total profit.
> Or fees? Something like that.
>
> > 5. How can m possibly be above 1? Give an example of a
> sidechain-attribute which may cause this situation to arise.
>
> The sidechain is a total scam.
> A bug may be found in the sidechain that completely negates any security
> it might have, thus removing any desire to protect the sidechain and
> potentially make users want to destroy it completely rather than let it
> continue.
> People end up hating sidechains completely.
>
> > 6. For which range of m, is DC designed to deter sc-theft?
>
> m <= 1
>
> > 7. If DC could be changed to magically deter theft across all ranges of
> m, why would that be bad for sidechain users in general?
>
> Because the sidechain would already be part of mainchain consensus.
>
> > --
> > 8. If imminent victims of a DC-based theft, used a mainchain UASF to
> prohibit the future theft-withdrawal, then how would this affect non-DC
> users?
>
> If the non-DC users do not care, then they are unaffected.
> If the non-DC users want to actively kill the sidechain, they will
> counterattack with an opposite UASF and we have a chainsplit and sadness
> and mutual destruction and death and a new subreddit.
>
> > 9. In what ways might the BTC network one day become uncompetitive? And
> how is this different from caring about a sidechain's m and b?
>
> If it does not enable scaling technology fast enough to actually be able
> to enable hyperbitcoinization.
>
> Sidechains are not a scaling solution, so caring about m and b is
> different because your focus is not on scaling.
>
> > --
> > 10. If DC were successful, Altcoin-investors would be harmed. Two
> Maximalist-groups would also be slightly harmed -- who are these?
>
> Dunno!
>
>
> Regards,
> ZmnSCPxj
> _______________________________________________
> bitcoin-dev mailing list
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev
>
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Billy Tetrud [ARCHIVE] /
npub1xq…tcnns
2023-06-07 23:04:57
in reply to nevent1q…yy04
Author Public Key
npub1xqcwcttsyk0a64d63crrwsxp88pa42np37rw87hrfn4uku78g2aqltcnnsPublished at
2023-06-07 23:04:57Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2022-02-26\n📝 Original message:\u003e m is how much people want to kill a sidechain, 0 = everybody would be sad\nif it died and would rather burn all their BTC forever than continue living\n\nMath is brutal\n\nOn Sat, Feb 26, 2022, 01:39 ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev \u003c\nbitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e\n\u003e Good morning Paul,\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e I don't think I can stop people from being ignorant about Drivechain.\n\u003e But I can at least allow the Drivechain-knowledgable to identify each other.\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e So here below, I present a little \"quiz\". If you can answer all of these\n\u003e questions, then you basically understand Drivechain:\n\u003e \u003e\n\u003e \u003e 0. We could change DC to make miner-theft impossible, by making it a\n\u003e layer1 consensus rule that miners never steal. Why is this cure worse than\n\u003e the disease?\n\u003e\n\u003e Now miners are forced to look at all sideblocks, not optionally do so if\n\u003e it is profitable for them.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 1. If 100% hashrate wanted to steal coins from a DC sidechain *as\n\u003e quickly as possible*, how long would this take (in blocks)?\n\u003e\n\u003e 13,150 (I think this is how you changed it after feedback from this list,\n\u003e I think I remember it was ~3000 before or thereabouts.)\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 2. Per sidechain per year (ie, per 52560 blocks), how many DC\n\u003e withdrawals can take place (maximum)? How many can be attempted?\n\u003e \u003e (Ie, how does the 'train track metaphor' work, from ~1h5m in the\n\u003e \"Overview and Misconceptions\" video)?\n\u003e\n\u003e I hate watching videos, I can read faster than anyone can talk (except\n\u003e maybe Laolu, he speaks faster than I can process, never mind read).\n\u003e\n\u003e ~4 times (assuming 52560 block per year, which may vary due to new miners,\n\u003e hashrate drops, etc)\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 3. Only two types of people should ever be using the DC withdrawal\n\u003e system at all.\n\u003e \u003e 3a. Which two?\n\u003e\n\u003e a. Miners destroying the sidechain because the sidechain is no longer\n\u003e viable.\n\u003e b. Aggregators of sidechain-to-minechain transfers and large whales.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 3b. How is everyone else, expected to move their coins from chain to\n\u003e chain?\n\u003e\n\u003e Cross-system atomic swaps.\n\u003e (I use \"System\" here since the same mechanism works for Lightning\n\u003e channels, and channels are not blockchains.)\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 3c. (Obviously, this improves UX.) But why does it also improve\n\u003e security?\n\u003e\n\u003e Drivechain-based pegged transfers are aggregates of many smaller transfers\n\u003e and thus every transfer out from the sidechain contributes its \"fee\" to the\n\u003e security of the peg.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e --\n\u003e \u003e 4. What do the parameters b and m stand for (in the DC security model)?\n\u003e\n\u003e m is how much people want to kill a sidechain, 0 = everybody would be sad\n\u003e if it died and would rather burn all their BTC forever than continue\n\u003e living, 1 = do not care, \u003e 1 people want to actively kill the sidechain.\n\u003e\n\u003e b is how much profit a mainchain miner expects from supporting a sidechain\n\u003e (do not remember the unit though).\n\u003e Something like u = a + b where a is the mainchain, b is the sidechain, u\n\u003e is the total profit.\n\u003e Or fees? Something like that.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 5. How can m possibly be above 1? Give an example of a\n\u003e sidechain-attribute which may cause this situation to arise.\n\u003e\n\u003e The sidechain is a total scam.\n\u003e A bug may be found in the sidechain that completely negates any security\n\u003e it might have, thus removing any desire to protect the sidechain and\n\u003e potentially make users want to destroy it completely rather than let it\n\u003e continue.\n\u003e People end up hating sidechains completely.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 6. For which range of m, is DC designed to deter sc-theft?\n\u003e\n\u003e m \u003c= 1\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 7. If DC could be changed to magically deter theft across all ranges of\n\u003e m, why would that be bad for sidechain users in general?\n\u003e\n\u003e Because the sidechain would already be part of mainchain consensus.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e --\n\u003e \u003e 8. If imminent victims of a DC-based theft, used a mainchain UASF to\n\u003e prohibit the future theft-withdrawal, then how would this affect non-DC\n\u003e users?\n\u003e\n\u003e If the non-DC users do not care, then they are unaffected.\n\u003e If the non-DC users want to actively kill the sidechain, they will\n\u003e counterattack with an opposite UASF and we have a chainsplit and sadness\n\u003e and mutual destruction and death and a new subreddit.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e 9. In what ways might the BTC network one day become uncompetitive? And\n\u003e how is this different from caring about a sidechain's m and b?\n\u003e\n\u003e If it does not enable scaling technology fast enough to actually be able\n\u003e to enable hyperbitcoinization.\n\u003e\n\u003e Sidechains are not a scaling solution, so caring about m and b is\n\u003e different because your focus is not on scaling.\n\u003e\n\u003e \u003e --\n\u003e \u003e 10. If DC were successful, Altcoin-investors would be harmed. Two\n\u003e Maximalist-groups would also be slightly harmed -- who are these?\n\u003e\n\u003e Dunno!\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e Regards,\n\u003e ZmnSCPxj\n\u003e _______________________________________________\n\u003e bitcoin-dev mailing list\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\n\u003e https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/bitcoin-dev\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20220226/cf55492c/attachment.html\u003e",
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