📅 Original date posted:2015-08-30
📝 Original message:
> Well-behaving nodes will always pay the fine, thereby keeping
> their link
> intact and keeping a healthy network of well-behaving nodes.
>
>
> The thing that I can't get to work out here is when you have a
> misbehaving node at the end of a chain, who doesn't pay their fine,
> but well-behaved nodes making up the rest of the chain.
>
If all fines are accumulated towards the payee side, the effect would be
that the last well-behaving node has to pay the fine. So we've punished
an innocent party. Luckily, this innocent party can prevent further
damage by closing the channel to the real bad guy. If the risk of paying
fines because of mis-behaving neighbors is really significant, you could
demand non-trusted (e.g. anonymous) neighbors to pre-pay a fine fund to
you, before you start routing payments towards them.
Of course you could also try to design a cryptographic payment channel
method for enforcing fine payment, but I think that, by now, we're
already so deep into 2nd-order, 3rd-order etc. effects that it might not
be worth the added complexity. You should keep things simple to make
them work reliably and have them implemented in time.
CJP
CJP [ARCHIVE] /
npub13q…cuzdm
2023-06-09 12:44:08
in reply to nevent1q…7f2g
Author Public Key
npub13q863scgpsaanrjhfn7dd4h48lgnupgkcs828arzj4pckrq8hh6s4cuzdmPublished at
2023-06-09 12:44:08Event JSON
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"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-08-30\n📝 Original message:\n\u003e Well-behaving nodes will always pay the fine, thereby keeping\n\u003e their link\n\u003e intact and keeping a healthy network of well-behaving nodes.\n\u003e \n\u003e \n\u003e The thing that I can't get to work out here is when you have a\n\u003e misbehaving node at the end of a chain, who doesn't pay their fine,\n\u003e but well-behaved nodes making up the rest of the chain. \n\u003e \n\nIf all fines are accumulated towards the payee side, the effect would be\nthat the last well-behaving node has to pay the fine. So we've punished\nan innocent party. Luckily, this innocent party can prevent further\ndamage by closing the channel to the real bad guy. If the risk of paying\nfines because of mis-behaving neighbors is really significant, you could\ndemand non-trusted (e.g. anonymous) neighbors to pre-pay a fine fund to\nyou, before you start routing payments towards them.\n\nOf course you could also try to design a cryptographic payment channel\nmethod for enforcing fine payment, but I think that, by now, we're\nalready so deep into 2nd-order, 3rd-order etc. effects that it might not\nbe worth the added complexity. You should keep things simple to make\nthem work reliably and have them implemented in time.\n\nCJP",
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