📅 Original date posted:2015-09-24
📝 Original message:
Mats Jerratsch <matsjj at gmail.com> writes:
> So far my impression was that an attacker that only stops one payment
> is just a nuisance, as the system can self-correct. The payer and
> payee can set a timeout. If the payment has not arrived after the
> timeout the payee can issue a refund back to the payer. The refund
> will pay to the same secret hash as the initial payment, and it will
> pay an amount that is sufficient such that the payer will receive his
> initial payment completely back. (That is, he might end up paying more
> refund than actual payment)
>
> When the payer does receive the refund in his channel, he can be sure
> that the payment got invalidated. The payee must not reveal the
> secret, and even if he does, the funds will just circle back again.
> (plus the payee will pay fees for both transactions as a disincentive)
> This concept has been around already, at least I read it somewhere.
Yes, I think it was Joseph Poon who suggested it. I'm keeping it in
reserve for the moment, in case this becomes common enough that we need
to code up a solution.
Your criticisms are valid, AFAICT.
Cheers,
Rusty.
Rusty Russell [ARCHIVE] /
npub1zw…hkhpx
2023-06-09 12:44:38
in reply to nevent1q…g25m
Author Public Key
npub1zw7cc8z78v6s3grujfvcv3ckpvg6kr0w7nz9yzvwyglyg0qu5sjsqhkhpxPublished at
2023-06-09 12:44:38Event JSON
{
"id": "f4b4eb188c0b6bd974f149def4d64938058d2f5bc9724eb77e85bf514525384a",
"pubkey": "13bd8c1c5e3b3508a07c92598647160b11ab0deef4c452098e223e443c1ca425",
"created_at": 1686314678,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"b5b57978740a799524f789c978ceee5f2bde61143922af5930a7f8658ef6ef76",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"e1b3da25f1377272710c8689fafca8ea27905dd52f953aac93e16e6e1776837b",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"b8a27d18150405cdfcd44c0dd8db860f5270312300248389bf57ce555c784528"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2015-09-24\n📝 Original message:\nMats Jerratsch \u003cmatsjj at gmail.com\u003e writes:\n\u003e So far my impression was that an attacker that only stops one payment\n\u003e is just a nuisance, as the system can self-correct. The payer and\n\u003e payee can set a timeout. If the payment has not arrived after the\n\u003e timeout the payee can issue a refund back to the payer. The refund\n\u003e will pay to the same secret hash as the initial payment, and it will\n\u003e pay an amount that is sufficient such that the payer will receive his\n\u003e initial payment completely back. (That is, he might end up paying more\n\u003e refund than actual payment)\n\u003e\n\u003e When the payer does receive the refund in his channel, he can be sure\n\u003e that the payment got invalidated. The payee must not reveal the\n\u003e secret, and even if he does, the funds will just circle back again.\n\u003e (plus the payee will pay fees for both transactions as a disincentive)\n\u003e This concept has been around already, at least I read it somewhere.\n\nYes, I think it was Joseph Poon who suggested it. I'm keeping it in\nreserve for the moment, in case this becomes common enough that we need\nto code up a solution.\n\nYour criticisms are valid, AFAICT.\n\nCheers,\nRusty.",
"sig": "e0c0f55adab9383d6cb7a22dd5cf0e6a741f320960f105d1360d0166c1de8f609ece7fd5f1a6be3415841b52717c74605472e71ff9a7718ccc4f51e286cc6dd3"
}