📅 Original date posted:2018-04-11
📝 Original message:
Hi Christian,
> That's not as bad a tradeoff as people usually interpret, the DMC
> construction has parameters that allow tweaking the number of
> invalidations, and with parameters similar to LN we can have 1.4 billion
> updates. Which is years of operation without need to
> re-anchor. In addition penaltyless invalidation has a number of
> advantages,
As far as I understand, long-lasting DMCs require either:
(a) an initial Refund transaction with a very distant relative
locktime
(b) periodic updates in the form of a Refund transaction pointing
to a new Refund transaction resetting initial the locktime, instead of
actually refunding.
For an extreme case of (a), if one party goes unresponsive and
decides not to sign new commitments then the counterparty in the DMC
will have its funds locked for a significant amount of time, without
penalising the unresponsive party. In the extreme case of (b), either if
as a result of a malicious, unresponsive, or honest participant, each
new refund transaction that resets the refunds may end up hitting the
blockchain, which means the worst-case utility of the channel itself
decreasing due to accumulative blockchain fees. Is this the trade-off
you speak of? if so, can you point at any resource where this trade-off
is tackled to get worst-case utility similar to that of LN channels?
Best,
Alejandro.
Alejandro Ranchal Pedrosa [ARCHIVE] /
npub1zg…6a6wv
2023-06-09 12:49:45
in reply to nevent1q…xr79
Author Public Key
npub1zgddj2q6cdxjr90emumrlk3npwjz2dunpxye56xent7guheaer4sk6a6wvPublished at
2023-06-09 12:49:45Event JSON
{
"id": "f4d2f40d13491c789d9b4071c8106655ddc3b4f500888f8a4fd6cb32b4e365c1",
"pubkey": "121ad9281ac34d2195f9df363fda330ba425379309899a68d99afc8e5f3dc8eb",
"created_at": 1686314985,
"kind": 1,
"tags": [
[
"e",
"324bb376a5989cc57735d95d15e241c13cf790cdb1ceb25efbf9b75937c90f61",
"",
"root"
],
[
"e",
"649e3548834df8e85300c4cea0da73d1b77cd0f756b00deb42bc68ef202795e1",
"",
"reply"
],
[
"p",
"72cd40332ec782dd0a7f63acb03e3b6fdafa6d91bd1b6125cd8b7117a1bb8057"
]
],
"content": "📅 Original date posted:2018-04-11\n📝 Original message:\nHi Christian,\n\n\u003e That's not as bad a tradeoff as people usually interpret, the DMC\n\u003e construction has parameters that allow tweaking the number of\n\u003e invalidations, and with parameters similar to LN we can have 1.4 billion\n\u003e updates. Which is years of operation without need to\n\u003e re-anchor. In addition penaltyless invalidation has a number of\n\u003e advantages,\n\nAs far as I understand, long-lasting DMCs require either:\n\n (a) an initial Refund transaction with a very distant relative \nlocktime\n (b) periodic updates in the form of a Refund transaction pointing \nto a new Refund transaction resetting initial the locktime, instead of \nactually refunding.\n\n For an extreme case of (a), if one party goes unresponsive and \ndecides not to sign new commitments then the counterparty in the DMC \nwill have its funds locked for a significant amount of time, without \npenalising the unresponsive party. In the extreme case of (b), either if \nas a result of a malicious, unresponsive, or honest participant, each \nnew refund transaction that resets the refunds may end up hitting the \nblockchain, which means the worst-case utility of the channel itself \ndecreasing due to accumulative blockchain fees. Is this the trade-off \nyou speak of? if so, can you point at any resource where this trade-off \nis tackled to get worst-case utility similar to that of LN channels?\n\nBest,\nAlejandro.",
"sig": "6824e99160f01593c1ec1095009e608c4e51d9c362a988626d16649828d219c4b2d395215ff7cda41742f3b39477a500ec9f0f7ece32603eb8e15d0b18f0a205"
}