š
Original date posted:2015-09-01
š Original message:My paper did show that the advantage decreased with the block reward.
However, in that limit, it also seemed to imply that a network state would
appear where the revenue per unit hash decreased with increasing hashrate
which should be impossible as just discussed.
In a followup email, I showed how the origin of this effect stems from the
orphaning factor used which doesn't preserve the full network revenue per
unit block. This led me to correct my assertions by pointing out that our
miner profit equations seemed to be just lower bounds to the miner's true
expected profit. As such, just because the *lower bound* on the revenue per
unit hash advantage decreases with the block reward, this doesn't
necessarily imply that the *real* revenue per unit hash advantage does also.
I suspect that the orphaning factor used, independently of the specific
form of the block relay time, is incorrect or incomplete as stated.
Best,
Daniele
Daniele Pinna, Ph.D
On Tue, Sep 1, 2015 at 10:06 AM, Peter R <peter_r at gmx.com> wrote:
> On 2015-09-01, at 12:56 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev <
> bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote
>
>
> FWIW I did a quick math proof along those lines awhile back too using
> some basic first-year math, again proving that larger miners earn more
> money per unit hashing power:
>
>
> http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03272.html
>
>
> I don't believe anyone is arguing otherwise. Miners with a larger
> fraction of the network hash rate, *h*/*H*, have a theoretical advantage,
> all other variables in the miner's profitability equation held constant.
>
> Dpinna originally claimed (unless I'm mistaken) that his paper showed that
> this advantage *decreased* as the block reward diminished or as the total
> fees increased. This didn't seem unreasonable to me, although I never
> checked the math.
>
> Best regards,
> Peter
>
>
>
>
>
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Daniele Pinna [ARCHIVE] /
npub16zā¦jg59c
2023-06-07 17:38:59
in reply to nevent1qā¦4q05
Author Public Key
npub16z2msvydkmd6xsjyrggnavcwrlpevfwq74x5avxrkg2dpq7cg6js5jg59cPublished at
2023-06-07 17:38:59Event JSON
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Original date posted:2015-09-01\nš Original message:My paper did show that the advantage decreased with the block reward.\nHowever, in that limit, it also seemed to imply that a network state would\nappear where the revenue per unit hash decreased with increasing hashrate\nwhich should be impossible as just discussed.\n\nIn a followup email, I showed how the origin of this effect stems from the\norphaning factor used which doesn't preserve the full network revenue per\nunit block. This led me to correct my assertions by pointing out that our\nminer profit equations seemed to be just lower bounds to the miner's true\nexpected profit. As such, just because the *lower bound* on the revenue per\nunit hash advantage decreases with the block reward, this doesn't\nnecessarily imply that the *real* revenue per unit hash advantage does also.\n\nI suspect that the orphaning factor used, independently of the specific\nform of the block relay time, is incorrect or incomplete as stated.\n\nBest,\nDaniele\n\nDaniele Pinna, Ph.D\n\nOn Tue, Sep 1, 2015 at 10:06 AM, Peter R \u003cpeter_r at gmx.com\u003e wrote:\n\n\u003e On 2015-09-01, at 12:56 AM, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev \u003c\n\u003e bitcoin-dev at lists.linuxfoundation.org\u003e wrote\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e FWIW I did a quick math proof along those lines awhile back too using\n\u003e some basic first-year math, again proving that larger miners earn more\n\u003e money per unit hashing power:\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e http://www.mail-archive.com/bitcoin-development@lists.sourceforge.net/msg03272.html\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e I don't believe anyone is arguing otherwise. Miners with a larger\n\u003e fraction of the network hash rate, *h*/*H*, have a theoretical advantage,\n\u003e all other variables in the miner's profitability equation held constant.\n\u003e\n\u003e Dpinna originally claimed (unless I'm mistaken) that his paper showed that\n\u003e this advantage *decreased* as the block reward diminished or as the total\n\u003e fees increased. This didn't seem unreasonable to me, although I never\n\u003e checked the math.\n\u003e\n\u003e Best regards,\n\u003e Peter\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n\u003e\n-------------- next part --------------\nAn HTML attachment was scrubbed...\nURL: \u003chttp://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20150901/352b7446/attachment.html\u003e",
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