Ali Sherief [ARCHIVE] on Nostr: 📅 Original date posted:2023-05-25 🗒️ Summary of this message: A proposed L2 ...

📅 Original date posted:2023-05-25
🗒️ Summary of this message: A proposed L2 protocol involves settling transactions on L1 after a delay of 3-6 blocks to mitigate the risk of reorgs. Users must wait for sufficient confirmation depth before receiving payments.
📝 Original message:Regarding this:

> Users are not so well protected during reorgs, e.g. if Bob double-spends
> a transaction whose funds were later used in a payment to Carol, then
> Carol loses the money. For this reason, Alice will probably want to
> prove to users that no funds they receive in a payment derive from any
> deposit less than safe_confirmation_depth blocks.

I'm of the opinion that any L2 protocol having a similar concept of block mining but for L2 transactions is a pretty good idea, but the reorgs trapdoor you mentioned could theoretically be mitigated ARK nodes considering their settling transactions on L1 as final after say, 3 blocks, or maybe even 6 blocks.

I'm leaning towards the standard 6 blocks, as this delay is invisible to users anyway, and only node operators will really notice it.

It is kind of the same way how miners can't spend coinbase transactions for 100 blocks.

It's a pretty good idea from Burak though, and I can't wait to see nodes in action with this.

- Ali

> Hi Burak,
>
> Thanks for this really interesting protocol! I tend to analyze
> complicated ideas like this by writing about them in my own words, so
> I've pasted my summary of your idea to the end of this email in case
> it's useful, either to other people or to you in helping understand my
> one concern.
>
> My concern is the same one I think Olaoluwa Osuntokun mentioned on
> Twitter[1] and (less clear to me) might be related to ZmnSCPxj's
> concern[2]:
>
> It seems to me that receiving a payment on the protocol, including
> conditional payments using HTLC, PTLC, or Anchor-TLC, requires waiting
> for the transaction containing that payment to confirm to a sufficient
> depth (e.g., I'd wait 6 blocks for small payments and longer for huge
> payments). Am I missing something?
>
> My summary of how I think that part of the protocol works is in the
> sections labeled "Make an unconditioned payment" and "Make a conditional
> payment" below. In short, it's clear to me how the service provider and
> the customer can make instant atomic swaps with each other---they can
> either spend instantly cooperatively, or they have to wait for a
> timeout. But how can a receiver of funds be assured that they will
> actually get those funds unless there's already a timelock and
> cooperative spend path placed on those funds?
>
> -Dave
>
> Rough initial summary of Ark protocol:
>
> Alice runs an Ark service provider. Every 5 seconds, she broadcasts a
> new unconfirmed onchain transaction that pays three outputs (the
> three Cs):
>
> 1. Change Output: money not used for the other two Cs that gets sent
> back to the the transaction creator.
>
> 2. Connector Output: an output that will be used in a future
> transaction created by Alice as protection against double spends.
>
> 3. Commitment Output: a CTV-style commitment to a set of outputs that
> can be published later in a descendant transaction (alternatively,
> the commitment output may be spent unilaterally by Alice after 4
> weeks).
>
> Bob wants to deposit 1 BTC with Alice. He sends her an unsigned PSBT
> with an input of his and a change output. She updates the PSBT with a
> commitment output that refunds Bob the 1 BTC and a connector output with
> some minimum value. They both sign the PBST and it is broadcast. We'll
> ignore fees in our examples, both onchain transaction fees and fees paid
> to Alice.
>
> From here, there are several things that Bob can do:
>
> - Unilaterally withdraw: Bob can spend from the commitment output to
> put his refund onchain. The refund can only be spent after a 24-hour
> time delay, allowing Bob to optionally come to an agreement with Alice
> about how to spend the funds before Bob can spend them unilaterally
> (as we'll see in a moment). For example, the script might be[3]:
>
> pk(B) && (older(1 day) || pk(A))
>
> - Collaboratively withdraw: as seen above, Bob has the ability to come
> to a trustless agreement with Alice about how to spend his funds.
> They can use that ability to allow Bob to trade his (unpublished) UTXO
> for a UTXO that Alice funds and broadcasts. For example:
>
> - Alice creates an unsigned PSBT that uses as one of its inputs the
> connector from Bob's deposit transaction. This will ensure that
> any attempt by Bob to double-spend his deposit transaction will
> invalidate this withdrawal transaction, preventing Bob from being
> able to steal any of Alice's funds.
>
> Also included in Alice's unsigned PSBT is another connector
> output plus the output that pays Bob his 1 BTC.
>
> - Bob receives Alice's unsigned PSBT and creates a separate PSBT
> that includes his unpublished UTXO as an input, giving its value
> to Alice in an output. The PSBT also includes as an input the
> connector output from Alice's PSBT. This will ensure that any
> attempt by Alice to double spend her transaction paying him will
> invalidate his transaction paying her.
>
> - Bob signs his PSBT and gives it to Alice. After verifying it,
> Alice signs her PSBT and broadcasts it.
>
> - Collaboratively trade commitments: as mentioned, the commitment
> output that pays Bob may be claimed instead by Alice after 4 weeks, so
> Bob will need to either withdraw or obtain a new commitment within
> that
> time. To trade his existing commitment for a new commitment looks
> similar to the collaborative withdrawal procedure but without the
> creation of an immediately-spendable onchain output:
>
> - Alice creates an unsigned PSBT that uses as one of its inputs the
> connector from Bob's deposit transaction, again preventing double
> spending by Bob. Alice also includes a new connector and a new
> commitment that again allows Bob to later claim 1 BTC.
>
> - Bob receives Alice's PSBT and creates a PSBT transferring his
> existing commitment to her, with the new connector again being
> included as an input to ensure atomicity.
>
> - Bob signs; Alice signs and broadcasts.
>
> - Make an unconditioned payment: using the mechanisms described above,
> it's possible to make either an onchain payment or an offchain
> payment---just have Carol receive the new output or commitment rather
> than Bob. That payment would have no conditions (except its
> atomicity).
>
> - Make a conditional payment: imagine that Carol knows a secret (e.g.
> a preimage) that Bob is willing to pay for.
>
> - Alice creates an unsigned PSBT depending on the connector from
> Bob's deposit transaction and creating a new connector. The PSBT
> includes an output paying Carol (either onchain or via a
> commitment) with an HTLC, allowing Carol to claim the funds if
> she
> reveals the secret or allowing Bob to claim the funds after a
> timeout.
>
> - Bob receives Alice's PSBT and creates a PSBT transferring his
> existing commitment to her with the HTLC condition attached and,
> again, with connectors being used to ensure atomicity.
>
> - Bob signs; Alice signs and broadcasts.
>
> - Carol can settle her HTLC by either revealing the secret onchain
> or by trading her commitment containing the HTLC clause for a
> commitment from Alice that doesn't contain the clause (which
> Alice will only accept by learning the secret, since Alice has
> to settle with Bob). Alice can then either settle onchain or
> trade commitments with Bob after giving him the secret.
>
> - Do nothing for 4 weeks: if Bob does nothing for four weeks, Alice
> can claim the funds from the commitment output (i.e., takes his
> money).
>
> If Bob did actually do something, and if every other user who also
> had an unpublished output in the commitment transaction did
> something, then they all exchanged their portion of the funds in
> this output to Alice, so Alice can now claim all of those funds
> onchain in a highly efficient manner.
>
> Regarding the connector outputs, although all of the examples above show
> Alice directly spending from the connector output in Bob's deposit
> transaction, atomicity is also ensured if Alice spends from any output
> descended from Bob's connector output. Connector outputs from different
> deposits can be used as inputs into the same transaction, merging their
> histories. This allows all operations made by Alice to be fully atomic,
> ensuring that she doesn't lose any money during a reorg of any length.
>
> Users are not so well protected during reorgs, e.g. if Bob double-spends
> a transaction whose funds were later used in a payment to Carol, then
> Carol loses the money. For this reason, Alice will probably want to
> prove to users that no funds they receive in a payment derive from any
> deposit less than safe_confirmation_depth blocks.
>
> [1] https://twitter.com/roasbeef/status/1661266771784126464
>
> [2]
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2023-May/021710.html
>
> [3]
> https://min.sc/#c=pk(B) %26%26 (older(1 day) || pk(A))