Conversation Details on Nostr: 📝 Summary: Ben Carman proposed using PTLCs to prevent a potential griefing attack ...
📝 Summary: Ben Carman proposed using PTLCs to prevent a potential griefing attack on LSPs providing Just-In-Time channels. SomberNight explained that the LSP can sign the funding transaction using adaptor signatures locked to the same secret as the invoice, making claiming the payment and opening the channel atomic. However, ZmnSCPxj raised concerns about clients waiting out the inbound PTLC and the potential for double-spending. The author suggests using a trusted third party or trust-minimized solutions to mitigate trust issues in Lightning Network transactions.
👥 Authors:
• Ben Carman ( Ben Carman [ARCHIVE] (npub17lt…7hwm) )
• SomberNight ( SomberNight [ARCHIVE] (npub1r3w…8xs3) )
• ZmnSCPxj ( ZmnSCPxj [ARCHIVE] (npub1g5z…ms3l) )
📅 Messages Date Range: 2023-05-09 to 2023-05-10
✉️ Message Count: 4
📚 Total Characters in Messages: 14336
Messages Summaries
✉️ Message by Ben Carman on 09/05/2023:
A potential griefing attack on LSPs providing Just-In-Time channels has been identified. The attack can be prevented by using PTLCs to sign the funding transaction.
✉️ Message by SomberNight on 09/05/2023:
A potential griefing attack on LSPs that provide Just-In-Time channels can be prevented using PTLCs, according to a proposal by Ben Carman. The LSP can sign the funding transaction using adaptor signatures locked to the same secret as the invoice, and when the client wants to claim the funds, they can do the PTLC dance with the LSP based on using that funding transaction. This makes claiming the payment and opening the channel atomic so the client can’t grief the LSP.
✉️ Message by ZmnSCPxj on 10/05/2023:
A potential issue with using PTLCs to prevent free channels in Lightning Network is that clients can wait out the inbound PTLC, forcing the LSP to perform an onchain action. Additionally, the LSP can coordinate with a miner to double-spend the funding transaction after the client has broadcasted it.
✉️ Message by ZmnSCPxj on 10/05/2023:
The author discusses possible mitigations for trust issues in Lightning Network transactions, including the use of a trusted third party or various trust-minimized solutions.
Follow Lightning Mailing List (npub1j3t…4gll) for full threads
Published at
2023-06-19 17:42:31Event JSON
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"content": "📝 Summary: Ben Carman proposed using PTLCs to prevent a potential griefing attack on LSPs providing Just-In-Time channels. SomberNight explained that the LSP can sign the funding transaction using adaptor signatures locked to the same secret as the invoice, making claiming the payment and opening the channel atomic. However, ZmnSCPxj raised concerns about clients waiting out the inbound PTLC and the potential for double-spending. The author suggests using a trusted third party or trust-minimized solutions to mitigate trust issues in Lightning Network transactions.\n\n👥 Authors: \n• Ben Carman ( nostr:npub17lts233cksw942zaqq8kkkgrc8hn9pfzgdyrce28nrf2vx49q7wq3c7hwm )\n• SomberNight ( nostr:npub1r3wz0qhmtp77ddyvm98wpy4zsta0k5ash8ejndqjp6s8epnx5plq2f8xs3 )\n• ZmnSCPxj ( nostr:npub1g5zswf6y48f7fy90jf3tlcuwdmjn8znhzaa4vkmtxaeskca8hpss23ms3l )\n\n📅 Messages Date Range: 2023-05-09 to 2023-05-10\n\n✉️ Message Count: 4\n\n📚 Total Characters in Messages: 14336\n\n## Messages Summaries\n\n✉️ Message by Ben Carman on 09/05/2023:\nA potential griefing attack on LSPs providing Just-In-Time channels has been identified. The attack can be prevented by using PTLCs to sign the funding transaction.\n\n✉️ Message by SomberNight on 09/05/2023:\nA potential griefing attack on LSPs that provide Just-In-Time channels can be prevented using PTLCs, according to a proposal by Ben Carman. The LSP can sign the funding transaction using adaptor signatures locked to the same secret as the invoice, and when the client wants to claim the funds, they can do the PTLC dance with the LSP based on using that funding transaction. This makes claiming the payment and opening the channel atomic so the client can't grief the LSP.\n\n✉️ Message by ZmnSCPxj on 10/05/2023:\nA potential issue with using PTLCs to prevent free channels in Lightning Network is that clients can wait out the inbound PTLC, forcing the LSP to perform an onchain action. Additionally, the LSP can coordinate with a miner to double-spend the funding transaction after the client has broadcasted it.\n\n✉️ Message by ZmnSCPxj on 10/05/2023:\nThe author discusses possible mitigations for trust issues in Lightning Network transactions, including the use of a trusted third party or various trust-minimized solutions.\n\n\nFollow nostr:npub1j3t00t9hv042ktszhk8xpnchma60x5kz4etemnslrhf9e9wavywqf94gll for full threads",
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