📝 Summary: Salvatore Ingala has proposed core opcodes for MATT, making them functionally complete. Johan Torås Halseth offers suggestions on the proposal. Antoine Riard discusses risks of cross-input inspection in Bitcoin contracts and the need for standards in software engineering R&D. Salvatore emphasizes the importance of experimentation. symphonicbtc raises concerns about security and censorship by miners. Salvatore argues for the potential use cases of cross-input introspection. symphonicbtc believes disincentives for attacks are sufficient and Bitcoin doesn’t need built-in defense mechanisms.
👥 Authors: • Antoine Riard ( Antoine Riard [ARCHIVE] (npub1vjz…x8dd) ) • Salvatore Ingala ( Salvatore Ingala [ARCHIVE] (npub1lpk…74n4) ) • Johan Torås Halseth ( Johan Torås Halseth [ARCHIVE] (npub1ppn…s2fw) ) • David A. Harding ( David A. Harding [ARCHIVE] (npub16dt…4wrd) ) • symphonicbtc ( symphonicbtc [ARCHIVE] (npub1tzu…45mf) )
📅 Messages Date Range: 2023-08-06 to 2023-08-19
✉️ Message Count: 9
📚 Total Characters in Messages: 60672
Messages Summaries
✉️ Message by David A. Harding on 06/08/2023: Salvatore Ingala has created a proposal for the core opcodes of MATT, making them functionally complete and improving implementation.
✉️ Message by Salvatore Ingala on 07/08/2023: The sender apologizes for confusion and inconsistent use of plurals. They explain that the opcode is now functionally complete and ready for experimentation.
✉️ Message by Johan Torås Halseth on 07/08/2023: The sender thanks Salvatore for the update on taptree verification and offers suggestions on the proposal, including opcode parameter ordering and the deferred amount check.
✉️ Message by Salvatore Ingala on 09/08/2023: The author thanks Johan for their comments and implementation. They discuss the ordering of parameters and the use cases for the deferred output amount check in CCV.
✉️ Message by Antoine Riard on 14/08/2023: The author discusses the potential risks of cross-input inspection in Bitcoin contracts, such as miners bribing contracts to censor transactions. They propose using flags or tags to enable selective introspection of inputs/outputs. The author also mentions the need for more malleability and efficient witness space consumption.
✉️ Message by symphonicbtc on 14/08/2023: Cross-input inspection in off-chain contracts could lead to malicious behavior, such as miners bribing contracts to censor time-sensitive lightning channel transactions. This raises concerns about the security of advanced bitcoin contracts.
✉️ Message by Antoine Riard on 18/08/2023: The author discusses the differences between oracles and miners in terms of game theory and utility functions. They also mention the lack of a complete security model for “DLC-like” oracles and the risks associated with cross-UTXO covenant inspection. The author emphasizes the need for world-class standards in software engineering R&D for the Bitcoin ecosystem.
✉️ Message by Salvatore Ingala on 18/08/2023: Antoine expressed concerns about the potential risks of cross-input inspection, but the response emphasized the importance of experimentation. Cross-input introspection has potential use cases, such as implementing eltoo-style replacement for lightning. The idea of using flags or tags to encode subset of introspected inputs/outputs was discussed, but further clarification is needed. The potential efficiency of this framework in terms of witness space consumed is still an open question.
✉️ Message by symphonicbtc on 19/08/2023: Miners are not always motivated by immediate profit, but also consider long-term prospects. Active transaction censorship would be considered a 51% attack and bitcoin would respond accordingly. Disincentives for attacks are similar. Bitcoin does not need built-in mechanisms to defend against miner attacks.
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